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flF.NERAL HISTORICAL IN'i'RQDl K II ON
"Taxation is part of the price of civilisation; 
for whilst it is possible to have Government 
without taxation, it is not possible to have 
taxation without Government. It was, there­
fore, a comparatively late arrival on the scene 
of social development: "for man, the hunter,
man the farmer and man the villager remained for 
the most part in happy ignorance of any form of 
taxation." (B E V Sabine, 'A Short History of 
Taxation')- Although Sabine was dealing with 
tax in the United Kingdom, his words were equal­
ly true of che position in South Africa and as 
will be seen later, income tax was a very late 
development in the history of South Africa.
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1.2
Taxation was introduced into the United Kingdom 
shortly after the Norman Conquest. In compari­
son with its European neighbours, Normandy was 
unusually developed and possessed certain ele­
ments of direct taxation, having a fairly well 
developed taxation system to finance its feudal
states.
1.3
The first tax levied in the United Kingdom was 
'Danegeld' which was a tax on land. During the 
12th Century under Henry II, a tax known as 
•scutage' was introduced. In the forty-five 
years of Henry II's reign, he exacted H scut­
ages, the rates varying from £1 per Knight to at 
least double that for the Clergy. Scutage was 
eventually replaced by 'tallage' which was 
originally the right of the Lord of the Manor to
tax his villeins.
1.4
The idea of taxing income and chattels was 
already making its appearance in the 12th Cen­
tury, when a tax on movables was impose to 
subsidise the first Crusade. In 'Legal Mile­
stones (3). The Introduction of Income Tax' 
Professor Broomberg said in De Rebus, March 1981
at 129 -
"Thus, new taxes ate, more often than not, 
the children of war. Certainly this is 
true of the income tax (which was born 
twice, both times in response to war situa­
tions) ."
He was referring to Pitt's Income Tax Act of 
1799, which was repealed after the Peace of 
Amiens in 1802 and reintroduced in 1803 when war 
broke out again. He might well have referred 
also, to the situation under Henry II, since the 
Crusade was a Holy War.
In relation to this tax on movables, Sabine (op 
cit at p.25) said -
"Henry II in 1166 ordered a levy of tup­
pence in the Pound on all movables The 
contributions, which were self-assessed, 
were to be paid into chests provided in 
every Parish. fiaud was to be punished by 
excommunication, but it is a fiscal axiom 
that the oath of the taxpayer never has 
formed the basis of fair taxation, except 
when combined with some power of verifica­
tion."
Here we see the airth of the rule regarding the 
burden of proof, which by Section 82 of the
Income Tax Act No 58 of 1962, as amended ("the 
Act") is placed n the taxpayer claiming that 
he is entitled to lome exemption, non-liability, 
deduction, abatement or set-off. It is also 
the origin of the reluctance of tribunals to 
rely upon the ipse dixit of the taxpayer.
1489 saw the birth of what became known 
•Morton's F o r k ' or the 15th Century version of 
Catch 22. Chancellor Morton introduced a 
statutory tux on income which was administered 
by commissioners who were not just collectors, 
but, in fact, made assessments "after their 
discretion". The rate was the tithe which was 
imposed on all freeholders from 1 January 
1489. The taxpayer was entitled to deduct 
rents, fees and services. There was also a tax 
on immovables. The principle of 'Morton's 
F ork' was that -
"Such as are sparing in the it manner of 
living, must have saved money, while those 
that live in a splendid manner, give evi­
dence of ability to pay."
One Will and Mary, C 20 of 1688 is remembered as 
the 'Original Land Tax Act'. In fact, however, 
it was theoretically designed to levy a general
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tax on income. Sabine states at p. 103 that
"Liability was attached to the first place 
to income arising from estates in ready 
money or debts or in goods, wares or any 
other personal estate; after deducting 
'desperate debts and moneys bona f ide 
owing'."
This tax ceased in 1712.
It was round about this time that we see the 
origins of the present day sales tax. Theo­
rists such as Hobbes and Sir william Pel y, 
advocated a theory that a man's total expendi­
ture was an equi table test of his taxability.
Tax was imposed on a large variety of items. 
There was the not r ious salt tax, a widows tax 
and many others. The interested reader is 
referred to the humerous, but rather sad Earl 
Grey" poster appearing on the cover of the March 
1981 edition of 'De Rebus' referred to in 1.4.
William Pitt was greatly influenced by Adam 
Smith's 'The Wealth of Nations' which was pub­
lished in 1776. Rut according to Sabine, what 
really influenced Pitt to a major degree in 
deciding to introduce an income tax into the
f.
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United Kingdom, was the "dixieme or 1 tenth' of 
Louis XIV imposed in 1710 on all incomes under 
four schedules, t ealty, salaries, securities and 
bus ine e s ."
1.10 The real beginning of income tax as we know it 
today in the United Kingdom was 3 December 179B, 
when Pitt rose as both Prime Minister and Chan­
cellor of the Exc’.^guer to deliver his budget 
speech. In the course of his speech, he con­
fessed that he was a belated convert to income 
tax and that only then was he convinced that -
"A general tax should be imposed on all 
leading branches o income."
The tax continued to be in force (with the short 
break referred to in 1.4) until 1815 when it was 
dropped. It was again imposed in 1842 under 
Sir Robert Peal and henceforth continued as an 
annual tax in the United Kingdom.
An abridged history of the taxation of Gold Mines in 
the Transvaal
2.1 Law No 1 of 1871 of the Zuidafr ikaansche Repub- 
liek was, what might be termed, the first gold 
law of the Transvaal. The main purpose of this
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law was to make provision regarding the disco­
very, the control and the management of the 
lands on which precious stones and precious 
metals might be found in the Transvaal.. Sec­
tion 1 of this law set a precedent which has 
been followed ever since in South Africa, when 
it provided that the right to mine all precious 
sto.ies or precious metals belongs to the S»ate, 
without prejudice to rights already acquired by 
private persons. Although this section did not 
deprive landowners of the ownership of precious 
stones and precious metals situate in, on or 
under their land, but only vested in the State 
the right to mine them, in practice th ?re does 
not appear to be a great difference between the 
two concepts. The taxes collected by the State 
during the early day of the Zuidafrikaansche 
Repub 1 iek were mainly por sor.a 1 and land taxes. 
The first signs of the introduction of the tax 
on gold appeared in Article 36 of Law No 6 of 
1875, which imposed a levy of Stg. 3/- on each 
ounce of gold product d by companies to which 
concessions had been granted over land not pro­
fitable to be worked bv individuals. One third 
of this levy was paid to the landowner.
This levy was followed by Law No 1 of 1883, 
Article 33 of which required all claimholders to 
pay to the Government each month 2^/2% of all 
gold produced By Article 28 of Law No 15 of 
1896, the holder of a mynpacht-.brief was required 
to pay to the State the greater of Stg. 10/- per 
morgen per year in respect of the land covered 
by his title, or 2 1/2% of the ’gross income' 
during the year. It was not until 15 February 
1899 that the first direct tax on gold mining 
profits was introduced This is co be found in 
1 Regulations regarding the payment of a 5% tax 
on the net profits of gold mines contained in 
the 'Staatscoerant1 published on 15 February 
1899. ’
The next development in the saga of the taxation 
of gold took place on 5 June 1902 when the 
Administrator of the Transvaal, by the Profits 
Tax (Gold Mines) Proclamation, No 34, 1902, 
repealed the existing 1899 Tax Regulations and 
by Section 2 imposed a tax of 10% on the annual 
net produce obtained from the working of claims 
and mynpachts and other gold-bearing properties 
situated in the Transvaal Colony. 1 Annual net
produce" was defined as ' ‘-he value of the gold
produced after deduction therefrom of the cost 
of production and of such sums as may be allowed 
in respect of the exhaustion of capital as here­
inafter defined'. Cost of production was 
defined as being all amounts actually expended 
during the year on winning and treating the ore 
under heads specified in an account contained in 
a schedule annexed to the Proclamation, but 
excluding all amounts of a capital nature.
I quote Section 4 of the Proclamation ir full, 
because it is clearly the forerunner of the 
definition of capital expenditu e contained in 
Section 36 (11) of the Act. The definition
was -
"(1) all amounts actually expended in
mine equipment, shaft-sinking, and 
development, whether incurred before 
or after the commencement of produc­
tion not being of a recurrent char­
acter, or such as are ordinarily 
defrayed out of revenue; and
(2) all amounts expended for ordinary
purposes of administration prior tc 
the commencement of production."
i.’uti ivoc lama clot, alyo made provision lor a 
determination of 'the exhaustion of capital' 
which was also defined and provided for an 
allowance for that exhaustion which was to be 
such <"um which, if paid by way of annuity over 
he life of the mine, would at 3% z o m p c m d  
interest, produce an amount equal to the amount 
of such capital.
There must have been some problem regarding the 
interpretation of that portion of Section 4 of 
the 19U2 Proclamation which referred to 'all 
amounts actually expended1. The meaning of 
those words was, by Section 3 of the General 
Revenue Amendment Ordinance, No 23 of 1906, 
deemed to be "the net amounts expended after 
taking into account all refunds, rebates, dis­
counts and like recoupments". The provisions 
of the 1902 Proclamation, as amended, bear a 
remarkable similarity to the provisions for the 
taxation of mines as it now exists in the Act. 
The principal features have remained unchanged 
in concept, although the details have been modi-
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the passing in t ho Transvaal of the Precious 
Base Metals Act, 1.908 (No 35 of 1908) - the Gold 
^aw which wao only replaced in 1967 by the 
Mining Rights A c t , No 20 Of 1967. Sect.on 46 
11 } (d> or the Gold Law directed that in the
case of a mining lease, no tax should be payable 
on the annual net produce under the 1902 Procla­
mation, and this situation continued until 1918, 
after which a share of profits derived from a 
lease granted to a mynpac t holder of land 
adjoining his mynpauht was payable to the State 
in addition to taxation.
Shortly after the establishment of t e Union of 
South Africa, Parliament enacted the Mining 
Taxation Act, No 6 of 1910, which came into 
force on 30 December 1910. This act repealed 
the Profits Tax (Gold Mines) Proclamation of 
J 9n 2 of the Transvaal, as amended, together with 
ithei: relevant laws in the other Provinces of 
vhafc had become the Union. The Mining Taxation 
\ct orovided for differential rates of tax on 
the profits of mining, these rates being 10% in 
ihe case of diamonds and gold and a sliding 
■leale depending on the ratio ot profit to gross
revenue, in the case of othei mineral . 
tion 4 (1) of the Act, defined 'profits’ as all 
revenue after deducting therefrom "the amount ol 
the worki' j expenditure and an allowance for 
amortisation of capital expenditure, as herein­
after provided". An interesting provision in 
this act was Section 6 which, in order to avoid 
double taxation of Gold Mines, directed that 
where the State was entitled to a share of pro­
fits under the 1902 Proclamation (which it 
repealed) and such share was not less than the 
tax leviable under the 1910 Act, no tax should 
be payable. There was a further direction that 
future leases granted by the State for the min­
ing of gold, should provide for the payment of 
an amount of not less than the tax leviable 
under the 1910 A c t .
All these provisions for the taxing of gains 
derived from mining, preceded the introduction 
of a general Income Tax Act in South Africa.
That situation terminated on 20 July 1914, wilt 
the introduction of the Income Tax Act No 28 of 
1914. Prior to the passing of this Act, there 
was no general tax on income in the Transvaal or
. j * r
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Orange Free State although such a tax was intro­
duced into the Cape by Cape Act No 36 of 1904 
and into Natal by Natal Act No 33 of 1908.
Section 5 ( ) of this act exempted from income 
fax, dividends received from -
a company liable to tax on its profits 
derived from mining; or
a company holding a gold mining lease under 
Section 46 of the Gold Law agd itself 
exempt from tax as set ut in 2.6.
Section 5 (n) exempted from fax, income deri­
ved from mining and subject to tax in terms of 
the Mining Taxation Act No 6 of 1910 or exempt 
from tax in terms of Section 46 (2) of the Gold 
Law, ie where, in terms of the lease with the 
Transvaal Government, a share of the annual 
produce was payable to the Government. The 
exemption under Section 5 (n) did not apply to 
income derived from sources other than mining.
The Mining Taxation Amendment Act of 1915 
repealed Section 46 (2) (d) of the Gold L a w ,
-
whilst retaining the tax exemption arising out 
of leases granted before the Amendment Act was 
passed. The 1914 Act was replaced by the 
Income Tax (Consolidation) Act No 4 1 of 1917 and 
at the same time, the Mining Taxation Act of 
1910, as amended in 1915, were repealed. This 
Act specifically provided for the taxation of 
profits derived from mining, including a tax on 
dividends distributed, including those distribu­
ted by gold mining companies. Special provi­
sion was made in Sections 17 (f) and 23 for the 
continuation of the system, by which in the 
determination of taxable income from mining 
operations, an allowance was made for the 
redemption of capital expenditure. Section 23
(1) introduced the 'quotient1 system appearing 
in Section 36 (1) of the A c t , resulting from the 
division of the aggregate of unredeemed capital, 
at the commencement of a tax year, and further 
capital expenditure during the tax year, divided 
by the estimated life in years of the mine.
Consolidating Tax Laws were subsequently passed 
in 1925 (Act No 40 of 1925) and in 1941 (Act 
No 31 of 1941). The latter in due course was 
replaced by the Act of 1962. This has been
substantially amended over time and it is with 
aspects of the A c t , as amended, that I propose 
to deal.
RMLKS O F _INTERPRKTATION
In considering the incidence of taxation upon lining 
companies, one must, as in the construction of all 
statutes, have regard to the primary rules of inter­
pretation. The following examples of the general 
rules will suffice -
in Schenker v The Master and Another, 19 36 AD 
136 at 142, De Villiers J A quoted with appro­
val , the rule in Rex v Venter, 1907 TS 915, 
which he said "had again and again been approved 
and followed by this court". He said -
"That rule is that, where the language of a 
statute is unambiguous, and its meaning is 
clear, the court may only depart from such 
meaning 'if it leads to absurdities so 
glaring that it could never have been con­
templated by the legislature, or if it 
leads to a result contrary to the intention 
of Parliament as shown by the context, or 
by such other considerations as the court 
is justified in taking into account.' I
quote from the judgment of Innes C J in Rex 
v Vente r ."
Lord Cairns in Partington v The Attorney Gen­
eral, 21 LT 370 at p.375 quoted with approval by 
De Villiers J A in Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue v George Forest Timber Cmnpany Limited, 
1924 AD, 516 at 53], stated -
"As I understand t • principle of all fis­
cal legislation, i •: is this: if the person
sought to be taxed comes within the letter 
of the law, he must be taxed, however great 
the hardship may appear to the judicial 
mind to be. On the other hand, if the 
Crown seeking to recover the tax, cannot 
bring the subject within the letter of the 
law, the subject is freed, however appar­
ently within the law, the case might other­
wise appear to be. In other words, if 
there be an equitable construction, cer­
tainly such construction is not admissible 
in a taxing statute, where you can simply 
adhere to the words of the statute."
In the Canadian Eagle Oil VR (1946) AC 119 at 
139 approved in CIR v Frankel, 1949 (3) SA 738, 
Viscount Simon quoted with approval the words of 
Rowlatt J in Cape Brandy Syndicate v Inland 
Revenue Commissioners, 1921 1 KB 64, at 71 -
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quote from the judgment of Innes C J in Rex 
v Venter."
Lord Cairns in Partington v The Attorney G e n ­
eral, 21 LT 370 at p.375 quoted with approval by 
De Villiers J A in Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue v George Forest Timber Company Limited, 
1924 AD, 516 at 511, stated -
'As I understand the principle of all fis­
cal legislation, it is this: if the person
sought to be taxed comes within the letter 
of the law, he must be taxed, however great 
the hardship may appear to the judicial 
mind to be. On the other hand, if the 
Crown seeking to recover the tax, cannot 
bring the subject within the letter of the 
law, the subject is freed, however appar­
ently within the law, the case might other­
wise appear to be. In other words, if 
there be an equitable construction, cer­
tainly such construction is not admissible 
in a taxing statute, where you can simply 
adhere to rhe words of the statute."
In the Canadian Eagle Oil VR (1946) AC 119 at 
139 approved in CIR v Erankel, 1949 (3) SA 738, 
Viscount Simon quoted with approval the words of 
Rowlatt J in Cape Brandy Syndicate v Inland 
Revenue Commissioners, 1921 1 KB 64, at 71 -
"In a Taxing Act one has only to looi mere­
ly at what is clearly said. There is no 
room for any intendment. There is no 
equity about a tax. There is no presump­
tion as to a tax. Nothing is to be read 
in. Nothing is to be implied. One can 
only look fairly at the language used."
Ab initio I point out that the taxable income of both 
mining companies and individuals carrying on mining 
is determined in precisely the same manner as the 
taxable income of other income earners, subject to 
special provisions of the Act relating only to mining 
and mining operations. The only difference between 
mining companies and individuals carrying on mining 
is in the rates of tax, the individual being taxed at 
the same rate as income derived from non-mining sour­
ces .
WHAT IS A MINERAL?
Section 1 of the Act defines - 'mining operations' 
and 'mining' as including -
"every method or process by which any mineral 
(including natural oil) is won from the soil or 
from any substance or constituent thereof;".
Before considering the meaning of 'mining operations' 
or 'mining' for the purpose of applying the defini­
tion , I propose to consider what is a mineral for the 
purpose of the A c t . Clearly, if the method or pro­
cess is not the winning of a mineral from the soil, 
the operation will not fall within the scope of the 
definition.
The Act does not contain a definition of 
'mineral' (other than to provide that it 
includes natural oil) , and not one of the South 
African judgments, dealing with the meaning of 
'mineral1 relate to income tax. Nevertheless I 
propose, below, to examine those cases in which 
the meaning of the word is investigated to see 
if one can arrive at an authoritative statement 
which can be applied in interpreting the defini­
tion 'mining operations and mining'.
In Roman times, minerals were regarded as fruc- 
tus in the legal sense, derived from ownership 
of land. However, a distinction was drawn 
between minerals and metals which are renascent 
and those which are not (Digest 24 . 3 7 . 13) . 
Ulpian held the view, for example, that marble
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in certain parts of Asia and Gaul renewed it­
self . (H P Viljoen in "Rights and Duties of 
the Holder of Mineral Rights" a thesis submitted 
to the University of Leyden for the degree of 
Ph.D.) In "Commentar on the Pandects" Book 
VII Title 1, Section 2 4 (i), Ganes translation, 
Voet stated, when dealing with the rights of a 
usufructuary "meanwhile it makes a great differ­
ence whether or no stones and metals renew them­
selves on the farm held in usufruct." Even in 
V o e t 1s time, the different treatment of 1metaJ s , 
chalks, sand and stone1 to which I shall refer 
below emerged. It is also interesting to note 
that in Ex Parte Lanham1s Executors, 1908 TS 330 
at 331, Wessels J refers to cases where minerals 
.9 "naturally renewed".
What emerges from the cases is that 'mineral' -
"does not have a defined content, but should be 
interpreted anew in the circumstances of each 
case. Generally, however, the analysis of the 
word into two senses, is one which has been 
adopted by the courts in approaching difficul­
ties of interpretation. The two general senses 
r f the word 'minerals' are:
(a) an extremely wide sense in which the word 
refers to all substances which are neither
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vegetable or animal and which are present 
in the *avth1s crust;
(b) a narrower sense (sometimes called the 
popular sense) in which a substance is 
required to comply with certain scientific 
criteria before being classed as a 
mineral. When used in this sense, sub­
stances such as stone, sand and clay, are 
generally excluded from the categories of 
minerals."
(Hattingh A J in Finbro Furnishers v Registrar 
of Deeds, B loemfontein, 1983 (3) 191 (O) at 195 
(H) to 196 (B). This is the most recent case 
dealing with the interpretation of 'mineral1 and 
the Judge decided that stone was not a miner­
al . The case involved the interpretation of a 
clause in a deed of cession of mineral rights 
and a cession of rights to stone, which was 
tendered for registration to the Registrar of 
Deeds, Bloemfontein. The Registrar refused to 
register the cession on the ground that stone is 
not a mineral and that was upheld by the 
court. The Judge in this case was not referred 
to Commissioner of T .ix-u; y Nyasaland Quarries 
and Mining Co Limited, 24 SATC 579 to which I 
shall refer below. However the judgment sets 
out all the other relevant cases at 195 and 1
_
->:>■ to examine those cases in some detail in 
'''' '3 illustrate the two senses in which the
■'o ct 'ninecai' or 'minerals' have been interpre-
'.ed v ou r  c o u r t s .
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was the case to espouse the 'popular'
isory ot tl, rpretation of the word
" '■ l|GL‘a 1 • I'oe case was before the Nigh Court
><’ the late South African Republic and was con-
:erned with the interpretarior of a clause in a 
iinety~nine year lease of ceri u o  land, clause 7 
' which provided that the lessee was to be
  1 * 1 oci to "alle mineralen, edelgesteenten,
■ietalen of andere delfstoffen" on the land 
eased and also conferred a right to prospect 
•nd dig for those minerals. Kotze C J who 
delivered the judgment of the court said -
it cannot be denied that Brissonius, and 
‘alloz, and other authorities quoted by Mr 
Wessels classify clay under mete Is or
minerals, but it does not follow that in
the case before us, we have to attach the 
lame meaning to the word. Clay, which 
mostly appears in the soil, is not consid- 
•rc'd in South Africa as metal, or mineral.
It has been very correctly remarked that it
~s.
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is not customary with u.. to .;pv ik, >» ;,ro 
pecting and digging for clay."
The issue in the case was whether the lessee wa 
entitled under the 1 ease to win clay from the 
land leased to him, and it was held that he war 
not After pointing out that if was necessary 
to arrive at the intention of the parties to the 
lease by considering the whole contract, His 
Lordship continued -
"We must rot give a scientific or extvno 
dinary meaning to the word 'mineral'
............  The words in the contract
must be explained in accordance with the 
usual and coir non meaning as in use in this 
country, although the scientific may be 
different."
7 • 2 Brick and Potteries Co v Registrar of Deeds,
1903 TS 4 73, was a case regarding the payment of 
transfer duty. The Registrar of Deeds took the 
attitude that a lease of all earths, clay, sand 
and other materials for pottery, earthenware, 
bricks, tiles and all other goods and wares 
manufactured from the said substances, was a 
lease of mineral rights and that accordingly 
transfer duty was payable. The judgment in th-
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court below is quoted in this case and at 4 75, 
Bristowe J is quoted as saying -
"It cannot, I think, be disputed that the 
Dutch word 'mineraal1 like the English word 
'mineral' includes both in its derivation 
and in its scientific sense, clay, sand and 
brick earth."
He continued at 476 -
"The meaning of the word 'mineral1 is 
therefore a question of intention to be 
ascertained from an examination of the 
instrument in which it is used.
The rule thus applied by the Learned Chief 
Justice to an in - ,ent inter partes 
applies (with th substitution of the 
intention of the legislature for the inten­
tion of the parties) to the interpretation 
of a statute."
He continued quoting from Maxwell on the Inter­
pretation of Statutes -
The words of a statute are to be under­
stood in the sense in whi^h they best har­
monize with the subject of the enactment 
and the object which the legislature has in 
view. Their meaning is not so much in a 
strictly grammatical or etymological pro­
priety of language, nor even in its popular 
sense as in the subject or in the occasion
in which they are used and the object to be 
attained."
The Court below, came to the conclusion accor­
dingly that br ickclay was a mineral, but this 
judgment was reversed on appeal by Innes C J , 
who referred to Donovan's case, which he pointed 
out, had stood for seven years, and had undoubt­
edly been acted upon very frequently during that 
period. He therefore, in effect, applied the 
principle of stare decisis. At 480, Innes C J 
said -
"Now are earths, clay and sand included 
within the term 'minerals'? in the wider 
sense of the word, there is almost nothing 
mined or taken from under the ground which 
is not a mineral. But after all the mean­
ings of mining terms vary in different 
countries, and it suems to me most impor­
tant to ascertain the sense in which the 
word is ordinarily used in this country, 
than to define its exact etymological sig- 
n i f icance."
Continuing at 481, the Learned Chief Justice 
said -
"Mr Barber relied on the definition of 
minerals in law No 12 of 1898, but that 
definition does not help us in determining
what the word means in a different statute 
passed three years earlier, and in any 
case, the definition there is not very 
clear as it depends largely upon the mean­
ing of the word 'mining', and the defini­
tion of mine again depends on the meaning 
of "minerals'."
Ifiis is, of course, the situation to be found in 
the definition of 'mining operations' and 
'mining' in the A c t .
Brick and Potteries Co Limited v City Council of 
Johannesburg, 1945 TPD 194. In this case a 
municipal valuator took into account the value 
of a deposit of clay situate on the land to be 
valued, which was used by the appellant for 
making bricks. The land was to be rated in 
terms of Ordinance 20 of 1933 of the Trans- 
vaal. Section 9 (2) of that Ordinance provided 
that in valuing any ratable property, the valuer 
was not to take into account any value accruing 
to such property by reason of the presence of 
inter alia base metals or minerals therein or 
thereon. Being dissatisfied with the judgment 
of the Valuation Court, the appellant appealed 
to a magistrate and the latter, at appellant's 
request, reserved, inter alia, the following
question for the decision of the Supreme Court -
"Whether the words 'base metals or miner­
als' used in Section 9 (2) of Ordinance 20 
of 1933 should be interpreted to include 
tire clay and/or other brickmaking clay 
found on the properties occupied by appel­
lant?"
In the course of his judgment, Maritz J found
that -
"What substance must be included in the 
general word 'minerals' appearing in a 
document or in a statute is a mixed ques­
tion of law and fact. What the public 
means by the word 'minerals' is a matter to 
be determined by evidence. The legisla­
ture, when it uses the word 'minerals', may 
not necessarily have in mind the popular 
meaning of the word. The construction, 
therefore, to be placed upon the word 
'minerals' appearing in a statute is a 
question of law."
In his concurring judgment in this case, Rams-
bottom J said at 204 -
"The meaning of a word used in a statute is 
primarily a question of law. in answering 
that question, the court may decide that 
the word was used in its ordinary popular
sense, or it may find by reason of the 
context or from a consideration of the 
circumstances in which the statute was 
passed, that the word was used in a differ­
ent sense. So far it is a matter of 
interpretation, a matter of law. If the 
court finds as a matter of interpretation, 
that the word was used in its ordinary 
popular sense, then in relation to a word 
like 'minerals', the question of fact may 
arise what substances are included therein 
'in the vernacular of the mining world, and 
commercial world and landowners.'"
His Lordship, in the last two lines, was refer­
ring to the test laid down in Next v Gill, (1871 
L.R. Ch. 699), Lord Provost of Glasgow v Fairie, 
(13 A .C . 657) and North British Railway v 
Budhill Coal and Sandstone C o , 1910 A.C. 116).
At 208, the Learned Judge said -
"But in my opinion it is not profitable to 
discuss the meaning of the expression 
'minerals' as if the subject were res 
integra. The question is what did the 
legislature mean by 'minerals', and the 
answer to that question is to be found in 
the history of Section 9 (2) and the 
decided cases."
After a consideration of the history of the 
sub-section from 1903 to 1933, when the Consoli­
dation Ordinance was enacted, Ramsbottom J con­
tinued at 209 to 210 -
"in the absence of any indication to the 
contrary, the word 'minerals' in Section 9
(2) bears the same meaning that it bore in 
the earlier enactments from 1906 onwards. 
See Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes 
(7th Ed. page 52). What then did the 
Legislature mean by 'minerals' in that 
year? I can find nothing in any of the 
Ordinances to show that the word was not 
used in its ordinary popular sense. That 
being so, the enquiry is what was the 
ordinary popular meaning of the word 
'minerals' in 1906. The authorities 
quoted by Mr Quenet, which I have mentioned 
above, show that this may be a question of 
fact to be decided on evidence. But as I 
have shown, evidence is not always neces­
sary. Where the ordinary popular meaning 
of a word has been judicially determined, 
the Legislature may be presumed to have 
used the word in that sense. And that, in 
my opinion, is the position in the present 
case."
His Lordship then referred to the Brick t, Pot­
teries Co case and Donovan's case and came to
word an unusual meaning. He therefore sup­
ported the traditional popular interpretation of 
the word. At 790 he quoted the following from 
the judgment of Innes C J in the Brick and 
Potteries Co case -
"But after all the meanings of mining terms 
vary in different countries; and it seems 
to me more important to ascertain the sense 
in which the word is ordinarily used in 
this country than to define it exact etymo­
logical significance. That was the view 
taken by the late High Court in the case of 
Donovan v Tur f fonte in Estates, where the 
court attached great importance to the 
sense in which the word 'mineral' was habi­
tually used in this country. The decision
in that case was given seven years a g o , and
has doubtless been frequently acted upon; 
and in dealing with this matter, it is 
impossible to lose sight of the inconven­
ience of disturbing, except upon the most 
cogent and convincing grounds, a definition 
of the meaning of an important expression
once settled by legal authority.............
it is in the highest degree probable that 
the Volksraad intended to use the word in 
the sense in which it was ordinarily used."
This judgment has been criticised by the authors
of the Mining and Mineral Laws of South Africa,
at 588, where they state -
the conclusion that the word 'minerals' in Sec­
tion 9 (2) must he interpreted as excluding 
ordinary brick-making clay.
Ex parte Erasmus 1968 (4) SA 788, was a case in 
which the word 'mineral' in Section 3 (1) (m) of
the Deecs Registries Act, 4 7 of 1937, conferring 
on the Registrar the power, inter alia, to 
register leases of rights to minerals, fell to 
be interpreted. The Registrar u? Deeds was not 
prepared to register a lease of rights to miner­
als in respect of stone and sand because he said 
that in the absence of a clear definition of the 
term 'minerals' in the Deeds Registries Act, he, 
as a layman, was not in a position to determine 
whether the substances were in fact minerals. 
Rabie J in delivering his judgment, referred to 
the Brick and Potteries Co case referred to in 
1 . 2  and the New Blue Sky Gold Mining Company 
Limited v Marshall. 1905 TS 363 (referred to 
below), nd came to the conclusion that the word 
'miner. in Section 3 (1) (m) of the Deeds
Regisf s Act, did not have a wide or scienti- 
f ic meaning and that there was no reason to 
think that the legislature intended to give the
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"This narrow interpretation o£ the concept 
of 'minerals' renders it incompetent to 
register as a mineral contract, a contract 
relating to such substances as sand, stone 
and clay. It is submitted that the deci­
sion in the Erasmus case is open to criti­
cism. Rabie J reached the conclusion that 
sand and stone are not to be regarded as 
minerals, after reviewing various authori­
ties on the interpretation of that expres­
sion. A further reason which he advanced 
against the inclusion of sand and stone as 
minerals, is that, if the substances were 
to be included within the concept of miner­
als, the lessee of the right to minerals 
would be entitled to go upon the land, 
remove the actual surface and thus render 
the ownership of the land useless to the 
freeholder. He went on to say that it 
could not be suggested that the right of 
the lessee of rights to minerals could 
extend to that degree, and that it was 
necessary to strike a balance between the 
competing interests of the surface owner 
and those of the mineral right holder. 
Although Rabie J referred in this regard to 
the case of Hudson v M.mn and Another, 1950 
(4) SA 485 (T), he did not refer to the 
principle laid down in that case, that 
where the conflict between the rights of 
the mineral right holder and the surface 
owner are irreconcilable, the rights of the 
mineral right holder prevails. It is an 
established principle that where the grant 
of mineral rights or a mineral contract
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fairly contemplates open cast mining, the 
surface owner of necessity accepts that the 
surface will be destroyed."
it is submitted that while this proposition is 
with respect to the Learned Judge perfectly 
correct in regard to the rights of :he holder to 
get to and win his minerals, it is of no assis­
tance in determining the meaning of the word 
'mineral' for the purposes of the A c t .
7.5 The next case to be considered is Secretary for 
Inland Revenue v Bozzone and Others, 1974 (3) SA 
826. This case was one relating to transfer 
duty and did not turn upon the interpretation of 
the word 'minerals'. It did decide, however, 
as other cases did, that stone, gravel and sand 
and other like materials did not constitute 
minerals as that word is used in the definition 
of 'property' contained in Section 1 of the 
Transfer Duty Act No 40 of 1949. The subsec­
tion read -
" 'Property* mea 3 land and any fixtures 
thereon, and includes -
(a)
(b)
) <0 ( Sd )
(•-) any right to minerals (including 
any right to mine for minerals) 
and a lease or sub-lease of such 
a right."
n doubser en Andere v Suid-AfrikaanseSpoorwee 
en Hawens, 1976 (4) SA 589 T. the court was 
concerned with the interpretation of a servi- 
ude. Once again the normal or popular meaning 
>t the word 'minerals' was espoused and it was 
teid that it did not include substances such as 
U n a r y  brick clay, sand or stone.
... the t n o a s e s  decided that certain sub- 
Lances we. not minerals. I now turn to con- 
rder those cases in which, in respect of dif­
ferent substances, a different conclusion was
reached.
’1 Marshall v Registrar o f Mining Rights, 1904 
I'H 2.10 it was held that tire clay, a stratified 
iock extracted by blasting, as opposed to ordin- 
ti.y clay (a soft substance obtained by quarrying 
on the surface and not as valuable as fire 
clay), was a mineral. This case was concerned 
with the renewal of a licence under the Base 
Metals haw 14 of 1897 of the Transvaal.
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The case of New Blue Sky Gold Mining I'offlpan^
Limited v Marshall, 1905 TS 473 was i dispute 
between holders of gold and base metal claims 
under Law 14 of 1897 and also came to the con­
clusion that tire clay was a mineraJ .
In Bazley v p gwan Gas Springs (Pty) Limi i , 
1935 NPD 24i , ,e court was concerned with th- 
interpretation of a reservation of mineral 
rights a deed of grant made by the Govern­
ment. The case depended on the definition oi
'minerals' in Section 4 of The Natal Mines A c t , 
No 43 of 1899, as amended (raw epealed by the 
Mining Rights Act No 20 of 1967), which defined 
'minerals' as
"All substances which can be extracted J :i 
the earth by mining operations for the 
purpose of profit."
There are certain exceptions to the definition 
which are not relevant . The case decided that 
carbon dioxide extracted 1 t om the earth by dri1 
ling boreholes to some depths, was a mineral In 
the purpose of Miat act. The definition is i 
simple and very practical one but it is submit 
ted that it is of no assistance in determining
- W
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what is a mineral for the purpose of the defini­
tion of 'mining operations' and 'mining' in the 
A c t , because of the particular wording of the 
definition in the Natal act.
7.11 nok:-.butg grick and Fire Clay Co Limited v Com - 
missioner for Inland Revenue, 1941 TPD 232, 
(although also deciding that fire clay was a 
mineral), was concerned with Section 10 (1) of 
Ordinance 12 of 1933 of the Transvaal which 
exempted from tax under the Ordinance "any por­
tion of a taxable income or any portion of a 
dividend distributed which is derived from min­
ing operations carried on within the Pro­
vince'. It was held that as fireclay had been 
regarded as a mineral in the Transvaal for many 
years, and still was, the extraction thereof 
from the soil, was 'mining'. I shall refer 
more fully to this case below, in relation to 
'mining operations'.
7.12 Glencairn I,im*> Co (Pty) Limited v Minister of 
Labour and Minister of Justice, 1948 (3) SA 894, 
was a case which turned upon the interpretation 
ot certain War Measures, which exempted employ­
ers from payment of cost of living allowance to,
amongst others - "(d) any employee whc is 
employed on a mine and who is provided by his 
employer with both rations and quarters."
'Mine' was defined in War Measure 39 of 1943 as 
"includes all excavations for the purpose of 
searching for, or winning metals, minerals or 
precious stones, but not including stone, sand, 
clay or similar materials for roadmaking, build­
ing, brick-and-tile-making or like purposes." 
Counsel for the applicant in this matter, keep­
ing both his options open, advanced the argument 
that the word 'minerals' in the definition of 
'.nine', was used in its widest sense, or, alter­
natively, in its ordinary popular meaning. In 
the course of his judgment, Dowling J referred 
to the law in England as set out in Halsbury and 
I shall refer to the current state of that law 
elsewhere in this paper. He also referred at 
898 to Great Western Railway v Carpella United
,
that -
"A useful test of what is a mineral in the 
ordinary and popular sense of the word, is 
propounded by FIetcher-Moulton, J . at 
p.231, in the following terms: -
V,
0 3 0 5 E (5d) 3 7
$
'if I were rash enough to venture a 
definition of 'mineral' I should say 
that it is any substance that can be 
got from within the surface of the 
earth which possesses a value in use 
apart from its mere possession of the 
bulk and weight which makes it occupy 
so much of the earth's crust. I 
should not think that what in engin­
eering cases is usually known as 'con­
tractors muck' is a mineral. To dig 
out ballast and crush stone and earth, 
a  mere mixture of heterogeneous por­
tions of the earth's crust for the 
purpose of making embankments, where 
the material goes from one position in 
the earth's crust to another, without 
modification, or being submitted to 
any process of manufacture, does not 
seem to me to be making use of miner­
als , although no doubt, the things 
that you are handling were originally 
with in the earth's crust. Such
matei iaIs have not a value in use 
apart from their bulk and weight, and 
they are only used as being capable of 
forming a portion of the earth's crust 
in a new position. On the other 
hand, everything that has an indivi­
dual value in use appears to me to be 
fairly called a mineral.'"
In the Great Western Railway case, applying the
test to limestone, the Judges came to the
conclusion that the substance was a mineral. 
Dowling J wcs able to avoid having to decide 
that the word 'mineral' was used in its widest 
sense as he came to the conclusion chat even if 
vhe term 'mineral' were used in the popular 
sense, limestone should be included in its 
denotation. He continued that it was legiti­
mate to take into account, the views of the 
English courts as to the ordinary meaning in 
English o the term 'mineral' provided that 
cautious regard is had to the fact that the 
statutes and instruments under consideration in 
the English case, are different from the War 
Measure now under consideration.
He referred apparently with approval to the test 
that a substance can be regarded as a mineral if 
it is so regarded 'in the vernacular of the 
commercial world, mining world, and landown­
ers'. On the uncontradicted evidence produced 
by the applicant, His Lordship had no difficulty 
in determining that lir„'stone was a mineral.
The case of Hex v Blom m d  Another, 1951 (1) 1 
708 (T), was another case concerned with the 
interpretation of the same War Measure as that
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contained in the Glencairn Lime case. The 
accused had been convicted of contravening the 
War Measure by failing to pay a cost of living 
allowance to their employees, and the point in 
issue was whether or not, a lime quarry was a 
mine. The Bench consisting of Blackwell and 
Roper J J had no hesitation in following the 
judgment in the Glencairn Lime case.
R v Day and Others, 1952 (4) SA 105 (N), dealt 
with the definition of 'mineral' in Section 2 of 
the Mines and Works Act, 12 of 1911. The 
definition of 'mineral' in that act, was -
"any substance obtained from the crust of 
the earth at any depth so long as it is 
obtained from the earth for the purposes of 
profit."
De Wet J came to the conclusion that the word 
'mineral' as defined in the Mines and Works Act, 
bore the widest possible meaning, namely that it 
was any substance obtained from the crust of the 
ear th so long a it was obtained for purposes of 
prof it. In thiii case, the court was concerned 
with the extraction of river sand which was dug 
out of a river bed. This, the Learned Judge 
held, was winning minerals which meant "getting
or obtaining minerals from the earth." Here 
again it is submitted that this case, based as 
it is upon a totally different definition in the 
Mines and Works A c t , is of no value whatsoever 
in determining what is a mineral for the purpo­
ses of the definition of 'mining operations' in 
the Ac t .
S V Funchal I 1961 (4) SA 52 is, i is submitted, 
also of no value whatsoever in determining the 
meaning of 'minerals' for the purposes of the 
Act. The case related to regulations framed 
under the Factories, Machinery and Building Work 
Act, 2 2 of 1941 and related to the operation of 
a plant which was used for the crushing of stone 
to various grades for use in building roads.
Tho Learned Judge, Jansen J relied on the deci­
sion in R v Day and Others, and came to the 
conclusion that stone crushed to various grades 
was a mineral for the purpose of Act 22 of 1941.
ITC 909, 24 SATC 97 a decision of the Special 
Income Tax Court of the Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland, and the appeal against that judg­
ment cited as Commissioner of Taxes v Nyasaland 
Quarries and M ining Co Limited. 24 SATC 579, a
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or obtaining minerals from the earth." Here 
again it is submitted that this c a s e , based as 
it is upon a totally different definition in the 
Mines and Works A c t , is of no value whatsoever 
in determining what is a mineral for the purpo­
ses of the definition of 'mining operations' in 
the A c t .
S V Funchall 1961 (4) SA 52 is, it is submitted, 
a I o of no value whatsoever in determining the 
meanim; of 'minerals' for the purposes of the 
Act. The case related to regulations framed 
under the Factories, Machinery and Building Work 
Act, 22 of 1941 and related to the operation of 
a plant which was used for the crushing of stone 
to various grades for use in building roads.
The Learned Judge, Jansen J relied on the deci­
sion in R v Day and Others, and came to the 
conclusion that stone crushed to various grades 
was a mineral for the purpose of Act 22 of 1941.
ITC 909, 24 S.ATC 97 a decision of the Special 
Income Tax Court of the Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland, and the appeal against that judg­
ment cited as Comm i:; si oner of Taxes v Nyasaland 
Quarries and M ining Co Limited, 24 SATC 579, a
judgment o£ the High Court of Nyaoaland handed 
down in 1961, arc of special interest. What 
was in issue was the definition of 'mining oper­
ations' and 'mining' in the Federation Income 
Tax Act and that definition is identical with 
the one in the Act save that the latter now 
refers to natural oil. The facts in the case 
were that the taxpayer carried on the business 
of quarrying a type of rock known as gneiss, 
which had qualities essentially similar to gran­
ite. The method of working consisted of dril­
ling holes in the rock face and loosening an 
area of rock by blasting. The rock so loosened 
was then transported to crushers and after 
crushing was screened into sizes suitable for 
road building, concrete and other building pur­
poses, garden paths and the like. Fieldsend J, 
the President of the Special Court, after set­
ting out what he characterised as "this vital 
definition" o! mining operations and mining in 
the Federation Act, stated at 99 -
"Unfortunately, this definition is not as 
helpful as it might be in the circumstances 
of this case, because it is based upon the 
word 'mineral' which itself has a somewhat 
elastic meaning. As the Full Court in the 
Blue-Metal Quarries case said: 'Few words
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have occasioned the courts more difficulty 
than 'minerals', but in some degree, that 
is because in legal instruments, it is 
seldom, if ever, used in its accurate or 
scientific sense, and yet the word posses­
ses no secondary meaning at once accepted 
and definite.'"
The President was referring to the judgment in 
NSW Blue Metal Quarries L i m i ", v Federal Com- 
m i ss ionet of Taxes , 1956 < f.) AiTR 239 .
The taxpayer had conceded in argument that in 
common parlance it could not be said to be car­
rying on mining operations, but it relied upon 
the statutory definition to which I have adver­
ted above. This, it was claimed, "swept away 
the distinction in every day language between 
mining and quarrying." The President quoted 
the definition of 'mineral' from Groat Western 
Railway and Karpella United China Clay Co (1909)
1 Ch. 218 and which I have set out in 7.12 
above, and stated that he found this to be the 
most useful authority as to the meaning of the 
word 'mineral' in its ordinary and popular 
sense. The Learned President came to the 
conclusion that the activities carried on by the 
taxpayer were 'mining operations' in terms of
have occasioned the courts more difficulty 
than 'minerals', but in some degree, that 
is because in legal instruments, it is 
seldom, if ever, used in its accurate or 
scientific sense, and yet the word posses­
ses no secondary meaning at once accepted 
and definite.'"
The President was referring to the judgment in 
NSW Bin e M et a_i jju < 11 r ies Limited v Federal Com - 
missioner of Tax*‘r,, 1956 (6) A1TR 239.
The taxpayer had conceded in argument that in 
common parlance it could not be said to be car­
rying on mining operations, but it relied upon 
the statutory definition to which I have adver­
ted above. This, it was claimed, "swept away 
the distinction in every day language between 
mining and quarrying." The President quoted 
the definition of 'mineral1 from Great: Western 
HaiIway and Karp''I La United China Clay Co ( 1909)
1 Ch. 218 and which I have set out in 7.12 
above, and stated that he found this to be the 
most useful authority as to h.ie meaning of the 
word 'mineral' in its ordinary and popular 
sense. The Learned President came to the 
conclusion that the activities carried on by the 
taxpayer were 'mining operations' in terms of
I- 1 tit ion in t *» Federation Income Tax 
■vc■ Although he did not rely on it, he drew 
•omfort from the decision in the Boksburg Brick 
i;id i i reclay Co L t d 1 a c a s e , to which I have
‘ft red in 7.11.
iopea1 to the High Court of Nyasaland, the 
hief Justice, Spenser Wilkinson, made ir clear 
that the court was not concerned with the mean- 
ng of the expressions ’mining1 and 1 mining 
weiat ions1 in their every day sense, and that 
decision in that case, must depend upon the 
-aning given to those expressions by the defi­
nition contained in Section '2. of the Federation 
income Tax Act. Having referred to the fact 
• hat the definition was not explanatory and so 
rima facie restrictive, but inclusive and 
therefore extensive, the Learned Chief Justice 
tated at 582 -
"In my opinion there can be no doubt what­
ever that in defining the expressions 
'mining operations' and 'mining', as it is 
done, the Legislature intended to give 
those expressions, when used elsewhere in 
the A c t , a meaning wider than the ordinary 
every-day meaning of those terms. More­
over, the extension of the usual meaning of
those expression;;, is obviously intenuviJ t 
be a wide one, for the words used are very 
general. 'Mining operations' and 'mininu 
are to include every method or process b 
which any mineral is won. It is hardly 
possible to imagine more general words."
His Lordship pointed out that as is customary it 
the interpretation section in statutes, it was 
prefaced by the usual caution "unless inconsis­
tent with the context". However, he found 
nothing in the Federation Act which suggested 
thuL this caution had any application in rela­
tion to the definition nder consideration. He 
continued at 584, after having come to the con 
elusion that 'mine' must include 'quarry' that
"This being so, I agree with the Learned 
President that the whole question in this 
case turns on the meaning to be attached tc 
the word 'mineral' in the definition in 
Section 2 of the Act."
He, too, Lelied on the extract from the Great 
Western Railway case set out in 7.12 above, and 
came to the conclusion that the word 'mineral' 
as used in the definition of 'mining' and 
'mining operations' is sufficiently wide to 
include gneiss.
Of special significance in his judgment, is the 
following statement -
"I am of the op nion that the numerous 
cases in which certain things have been 
held to be minerals and certain things not 
to have been minerals, are of very little 
assistance in determining the matters in 
question in this appeal, because those 
authorities merely decide whether a parti­
cular commodity is or is not a mineral 
within the meaning of some particular 
statute o; document, and it is noteworthy 
that a large number of things have in some 
cases been held to be minerals and in other 
cases, held not to be minerals."
The Learned Judge did not accept the argument on 
behalf of the Commissioner that all that the 
taxpayer was really doing was to shift part of 
the earth's surface from one place to another, 
so what they were really doing amounted to 
moving 'contractors muck' as described in the 
definition of 'mineral' given in the Great 
Western Railway case. He found at 585 that the 
taxpayer's activity "not only went far beyond 
moving material from one position in „he earth's 
crust to another, but also include modifications 
to the material and submitting it to a process 
of manufacture, namely, crushing and
screening." Finally, the Chief Justice 
concurred in the judgment of the President in 
the Court Below and dismissed the appeal.
Southworth J delivered the main judgment of the 
High Court and he too quoted, with approval, the 
definition of 'mineral 1 from the Great Western 
Railway case. He did not accept the argument 
for the Commissioner that the definition direc­
ted specifically to the facts of the case in 
which it was given, and stated that the defini­
tion was in the most general terms and clearly 
not restricted to the facts of any particular 
case. He pointed out that the definition did 
not appear to have been called in question in 
any subsequent case or in any text, but had 
frequently been cited with approval. He con­
tinued at 590 -
"Though not binding on the court in the 
present case, it must be entitled to the 
greatest respect; and in the absence of 
anything in the local legislation to dis­
place it, must be regarded as a valuable 
guiv . to the meaning of the term 'mineral1
W * F
Referring to the Third Edition of Halsbury1s 
Laws of England (to the Fourth Edition of which 
I shall refer below), the Learned Judge pointed 
out that granite, a similar rock to the gneiss 
with which tha case was concerned, had ~een 
found in one context to be a mineral and in 
another context not to be a mineral. He said -
"Thus, it is clear that in the present 
context, it may or may not be a mineral 
according to the intention of the statute."
In dealing with the facts of the case in the 
Court below (which facts are not fully reported 
in the SATC Report), the President had stated -
"It is true that geologically, and in its 
composition, this stone, which s known as 
gneiss, is not the same as granite, but it 
is extracted by the appellant just as 
granite is and it is sold for similar pur­
poses, namely for road building, concrete 
and other building purposes, garden paths 
and such like."
Great stress was laid by Southworth J on the 
fact that there was nothing in the stated case 
to indicate that gneiss formed the normal 
substance of the earth's crust in Nyasaland.
eV.» ' , '
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Referring to the Third Edition of Halsbury's 
Laws of England (to the Fourth Edition of which 
I shall refer below), the Learned Judge pointed 
out that granite, a similar rock to the gneiss 
with which the case was concerned, had been 
found in one context to be a mineral and ir. 
another context not to be a mineral. He said -
"Thus, it is clear that in the present 
context, it may or may not be a mineral 
according to the intention of the statute."
In dealing with the facts of the case in the 
Court below (which facts are not fully reported 
in the SATC Report), the President had stated -
"It is true that geologically, and in its 
composition, this stone, which is known as 
gneiss, is not the same as granite, but it 
is extracted by the appellant just as 
granite is and it is sold for similar pur­
poses, namely for road building, concrete 
and other building purposes, garden paths 
and such like."
Great stress was laid by Southworth J on the 
fact that there was nothing in the stated case 
to indicale t’>at gneiss formed the normal 
substance of the earth's crust in Nyasaland.
He said that it was quite clear as a matter of
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common observe-ion that much of the surface of 
N y a s a V m d  does not consist of outcropping rock, 
whether of gneiss or any other rock. He also 
placed great stress on the fact that the gneiss, 
Ithough undergoing no change in its actual 
composition before leaving the taxpayer's hands, 
underwent two processes of treatment, namely 
crushing and screening, "processes which must be 
taken substantially to change its physical form, 
so as to render it suitable for purposes such as 
road-making, the making of garden paths, the 
mixing of concrete and other building purpo­
ses." He continued at 592 -
"In these circumstances then, the gneiss 
quarried by the respondents can hardly be 
regarded as 'only used as being capable of 
forming a portion of the earth's crust in a 
new position'; and the Learned President 
wouId seem to be justified in regarding it 
as having 'a value in use apart from is 
bulk and weight' within the meaning of 
Fletcher-Moulton L J's definition."
In the result, he, too, concurred in the judg­
ment of the Special Court and dismissed the 
appeal.
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shall be construed as prohibiting or res­
tricting or enabling the nocal Authority 
to prohibit or resit.ct
(a) the winning o£ minerals by undei- 
ground working, or the winning of 
minerals by surface working, or the 
erection of any buildings or the 
carrying out of any work which is 
incidental thereto, as regards any 
land not included in established 
townships and agricultural holdings;
One of the principal issues in the application 
to the Witwatersrand Local Division, was whether 
the quarrying operations carr ed out by the 
appellant on its property, fell within the 
exemption confern I by Section 18 (a). What 
had happened was that the appellant planned to 
establish a stone quarry on a portion of its 
property. It obtained the necessary permission 
from the Department of Mines and made applica­
tion to the then Local Authority, the Peri-Urban 
Areas Board, for permission to commence quarry­
ing and ancillary operations. The Board 
advised the appellant that its consent was not 
required, the reason given being, that the acti­
vities would fall within the terms of Section 18 
(a) of the Town Planning Scheme and that in 
hnr.na of loqal opinion given to the Local
For reasons whii appear below, it is submitted 
that this judgment should not be followed in 
South Africa.
Falcon I n  vest men t s  J a m  i  te< i v _ ( j j . of B i  t na in
(Suburban) (Pty) Limited and Others, 1973 (4) SA 
A 38 4, appears to be the only Appellate Division 
judgment dealing with the meaning of the word 
'mineral1. This was an appeal direct to the 
Appellate Division from a decision or Margo J in 
the Witwatersrand Local Division in which an 
order was granted interdicting the appellant 
from using or allowing the use of its property 
for quarrying operations or for the operation of 
stone crushing, ready-mixed concrete or asphalt 
plants, until such time as such operations were 
authorised by an amendment to the Southern 
Johannesburg Region Town Planning Scheme,
1962. The respondent in the appeal was the 
owner of certain land in Johannesburg and 
alleged that the appellant, who was the owner of 
land in the same area, used its land in contra­
vention of the Town Planning Scheme. Howevc- 
Section 18 of the Scheme provided that -
"18. ... ............ nothing in the foregoing
provisions of this part of the Scheme,
0306E(5d) 51
Authority "the word 'mineral' means 'any sub­
stance taken or obtained trom the earth's crust, 
which will include sand, gravel, stone, etc.'" 
The area to be quarried had been successfully 
prospected for a type of rock known as andesite, 
which was particularly suitable for use in con­
crete and for road-making purposes. During 
December 1969 in anticipation of the takeover of 
jurisdiction by the Johannesburg City Council, 
the appellant had entered into an agreement with 
that Council in terms of which, inter alia, the 
appellant was given the right for a period of 
sixty years, to carry on quarrying, stone crush­
ing and ancillary operations, including the 
operation of ready-mixed concrete and asphalt 
plants. The Johannesburg City Council had 
therefor » consented to the use of the 
appellant's property for the purposes afore­
said. However, in the granting of such con­
sent, the provisions of the Town Planning Scheme 
were not followed. During 1970 quarrying and 
crushing operations on another property, falling 
within the jurisdiction of the Johannesburg City 
Council, w?re conducted by Tucker's Land Hold­
ings Limited and the City Council successfully 
applied to the Witwatersrand T.ocal Division for
an interdict restraining such activities on the 
grounds that they vere in contravention of the 
Town Planning Scheme (see Johannesburg City 
Counci 1 v T u c kor 1s Land Mol dings Limited and 
Others, 19 71 (2) SA 478 W. a judgment which is 
not relevant to the subject under consideration.)
In the Falcon Investments1 case it was contended 
that the substance being quarried, andesite, is 
a mineral for the purposes of Section 18 (a) of 
the Town Planning Scheme and that the quarrying 
and crushing operations constituted the winning 
of minerals. The court had before it conflic­
ting affidavits by geologists. In the one 
affidavit a learned professor of Geology stated, 
inter alia, that -
"The following definitions of the term 
'mineral' and 'rock' are those accepted by 
geologists in both scientific terms and 
common parlance."
After setting out the scientific definition, he 
concluded that in his opinion "andesite is rock 
and not a mineral in both scientific terms and 
common parlance." To counter this, there was 
an affidavit by a consulting geologist who
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stated, inter alia, that he had read the defini­
tion of a mineral as contained in the Mines and 
Works Act l l  of 1956, as amended, and the 
definition of a base mineral, as contained in 
Section 1 of the Mining Rights Act, 20 of 1967, 
as amended. He continued that he had examined 
the substance being quarried anu confirmed that 
it is geologically known as andesite or andesi- 
tic lava of the Ventersdorp system; that the 
said andesite was a substance which occurs 
naturally in or on the earth and that in his 
opinion, it was a mineral in terms of the defi­
nition of 'mineral1 in the two Acts referred to 
above. He also stated that the andesite occur­
ring on the appellant's property had a substan­
tial commercial value.
On behalf of the appellant, it was submitted 
that 'mineral' had a broad range of meanings, 
including the narrowest and broadest meanings, 
but also an intermediate meaning which "would 
include stone which has a commercial value 
because of its special properties apart from its 
me e bulk." His Lordship quoted from the 
Oxford English Dictio iry and continued at 
396 A -
’I'Vioiit decided cases in our courts, as well 
1 i om statutes of out Legislature, it 
ii.RO elea’ Ly appears that the word 
'.ilneca1 ‘ may be used in different senses, 
*d ,.( ‘ ollows that in order to decide what
meaning is that has to be given to the 
'i < particular case, it is necessary 
determine the intention with which the 
d ■' tsed."
m. use v> -hf word ’mineral1 in a 
ii wev nse, His Lordship quoted from Dono-
,r ' ' the Rrick and Potteries Co case, the
43,shall case, the New Blue Sky Gold Mining 
ompanx Limited caie, ex parte Erasmus and the 
,CK and lotteries Co Liir, ted case. In regard 
t h e  Lastmentioned case, after quoting an 
a ; 'ict from the judgment of Ramsbottom J, which 
cited in .3 above, Rumpff J A considered
expedient at 399 to refer to what was said by
gan C J and Schreiner, J A in Consolidated 
imond Mines of South West Africa Limited v 
dmir. i stt ator , SWA and Another, 19bti (4) 572 A 
!• i99 f.n w m c h  judgment the Chief Justice 
<La ted, inter alia -
"Since words have to be read in their con- 
t and in their applica ion to the 
subject-matter to wnich tney relate, legal 
principles which iffecl that subject-matter
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in relation to it. Decisions of ou 
courts are therefore useful precedent; l. 
the enunciation of legal principles and a.*- 
guides in the application of those prin­
ciples to particular facts and circumstan 
ces. When we find in a judgment state 
ments which attach meaning to particular 
words or p h n s o s ,  we must remember that fct 
Judge is dealing with those words or 
phrases in the context in which they occui 
and with reference to the subjectmattev tc 
which they relate. Beyond that, a state 
ment as to the meaning of a word or phrase, 
would merely be obiter dictum. J should 
be loath to read a judge's elucidation of a 
word with no specialised legal meaning, a; 
intending to lay down as a matter of law, 
what that word means, independently of th-. 
context in which ht is dealing with it, fo; 
defining the meaning of words as such, i 
not a judge's function, but that of «  
philologist. A judge's statement on tin 
meaning of such a word can be no more than 
ar: expi ession of his opinion on a matter 
outside his domain of special knowledge, 
which is that of law and not of language."
That statement was approved by Potgictei J  A  in 
v Anglo African Shipping Company (193 b
Limited, 1972 (2) SA, 827 at 834 H.
He also quoted the following extract from the 
judgment of Schreiner J in the Consolidated 
Diamond Mines' case at 637 -
"It is sometimes said, and for certain 
purposes no doubt correctly, that the pro­
per interpretation of a document is a ques­
tion of law. But particularly in cases 
where the effect of the context bulks 
largely, the approach must necessarily be 
rather that of the approach to questions of 
I act, to this extent at least that previous 
decisions on the meaning of the same word 
in different contexts can hardly be more 
than suggestive, and possibly only faintly 
suggestive, of the meaning that may be 
proper in the case under consideration."
His Lordship was also referred to a large number 
of other cases but said that it was not neces­
sary to discuss them, because it was clear that 
in each case it is the intention with which the 
parties ur the lawgiver used the word 'mineral1 
that must be ascertained. His Lordship under­
took an in-depth investigation of the provisions 
of the Town Planning Scheme and pointed out that 
as far as control over the exploitation itself 
of minerals is concerned, the State had consis­
tently regarded the word 'mineral' in its widest 
sense. In this connection he referred to the
'r *,-1 y
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ano Works Act 27 of 1956. He also referred to 
the Base Minerals Act 1942. At page 403 B, His 
Lordship continued -
"The Beheme is legislation hy a Local 
Authority dealing, inter alia, with the use 
of land, and restricting such use, within 
its area of jurisdiction. it also deals 
with the subject of mining, the general 
intention discernible in regard thereto 
being that in certain specified areas, the 
Scheme is not to operate so as to prohibit 
or restrict mining. ........... 'Minerals'
is not defined in the Scheme. It is 
desirable, I think that the word should, if 
possible, be interpreted in such a way that 
the Scheme blends harmoniously with such 
other legislation. In the absence of 
^Loar indications to the contrary, it can 
be inferred, I think, that this must have 
been the intention of the Local Author­
ity. Indeed, the Local Authority could 
hardly have intended 'mineral1 to bear a 
narrower meaning than the same or similar 
expressions bore in the statutes just men­
tioned, especially the Gold Law and Base 
Minerals A c t ,".
Finally, at 405 H, His Lordship concluded -
In the result, T am of the opinion, that 
the word 'minerals’ in Sec. 18 (a) was
intended 10 be used in a wide sense. It 
i "• not necessary to determine its precise 
ambit; it suffices merely to say that its 
meaning is wide enough to include andesite 
as described in the evidence."
His Lordship then proceeded to uphold the appeal 
and to dismiss the application for the interdict 
which had been granted in the Lower Court.
In an unreported judgment by Moll J in ex parte 
Wonderstone 1*37 Limited which was delivered in 
the Transvaal Provincial Division on 9 April 
1975, His Lordship held that wonderstone pyro- 
phyllite is a mineral for the purposes of Sec­
tion 3 (1) (m) of the Deeds Registries Act of
1937. In the Finbro Furnishers case at 196, 
Hattingh A J , states that he was able to obtain 
a copy of the unreported judgment, from which it 
appeared that the facts of the case were clearly 
distinguishable from those in the Erasmus 
case. In Wonderstone, expert evidence was 
available to the court to the effect that 
wonderstone is a we 11known mineral, possessing 
special characteristics of its own.
The next case to be considered is that of 
Hellville-Inry (Edms) Bpk v Continental China
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(Pty^ Limited, 1976 (3) SA C 563. In this case 
Van Winsen J , (as he then was), was concerned 
With i mining lease which conferred the right to 
prospect, search for and to win, mine and 
recover all kaolin on the leased property. The 
lease had been notarially executed and regis­
tered in the appropriate Deeds Registry and one 
of the disputes which arose between the parties 
in the litigation was whether an extension of 
the period of the original lease required 
notarial attestation to render it valid, having 
regard to the provisions of Section 3 of the 
General Law Amendment Act 50 of 1956, requiring 
mineral leases to be notarially executed. The 
respondent which held the mineral lease, had, by 
letter, purported to extend the term of the 
lease, as it was entitled to do, but that letter 
was not notarially attested. The applicant, 
therefore, applied for a declaration that the 
lease had lapsed at the end of its initial 
period. The first question to be decided by 
His Lordship, therefore, was whether the exten­
sion of the lease was valid. This, in turn, 
required him to consider whether or not kaolin 
was a mineral. At 585 G he said -
mmr' — ""iwl
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"It is to be noted that the parties to the 
lease described it as a mineral, thereby 
indicating that they considered kaolin to 
be a mineral and the lease was so register­
ed in the transfer deed under which appli­
cant holds the property. If, however, 
kaolin is in fact not a mineral, the treat­
ment by the parties of it as such, would 
not render it a mineral. Act 50 of 1956 
does not itself define a 'mineral1 and an 
aid to interpret the meaning of that word 
in the A c t , must be sought elsewhere.
While assistance can be sought from the 
meaning ascribed to the word in diction­
aries, in the decisions of the Courts, and 
in the definition attached to the word in 
other statutes, it must be remembered that 
the enquiry remains one as to the sense in 
which the lawgiver used the word in Section 
3 of Act 50 of 1956."
After referring to definitions of the word 
•min ral' in the Oxford English Dictionary and 
Webster's D ctionary, His Lordship pointed out 
that the word 'mineral' can bear either a wide 
or a narrow meaning. He then proceeded at 586 
to examine the meaning of the word in statutes 
such as the Mines and Works Act, 2 1  of 1956 
which included the very wide definition of 
'mineral' as follows -
" 'Mineral1 means any substance, whether in 
solid, liquid or gaseous form occurring 
naturally in or on the earth and having 
been formed by or subjected to a geological 
process, but does not include water and 
soil unless they are taken from the earth 
for the production or extraction therefrom 
of a product of commercial value."
His Lordship also referred to the Base Minerals 
Act, 39 of 1942, he continued at 586 F -
"The tendancy of the legislature to attach 
a wide meaning to 'base minerals' was con­
tinued in Act 20 of 1967, but since I am 
presently concerned witn the meaning to be 
attached to a Sec. of a 1956 Act, no fur­
ther reference to the 1967 Act would be 
relevant."
He proceeded to refer to the Falcon Investments 
Limited case, Donovan's case and others referred 
to above in this report. At 587 D, he pointed
Ander v Pool N O , 1966 
(3) SA 96 (AD), it seemed to have been accepted 
that a lease granting the right to prospect for 
and mine kaolin, fell within the scope of Sec­
tion 3 of the General Law Amendment Act 50 of 
1956 requiring notarial attestation.
At 588 D, the Learned Judge said -
"With respect to aspects of the reasoning 
in certain of the above-quo.ed cases, I 
find it difficult to conceive why a statute 
should be so interpreted as to attach a 
meaning to a word like 'minerals' narrower 
than that assigned to it by definition in a 
number of statutes especially concerned 
with minerals and the rights associated 
therewith. More especially is this so 
when the dictionary meaning of the word, in 
its mor< restricted sense, generally 
accords with the definition contained in 
the relevant statutes (I use the phrase 
'more restricted sense' to distinguish this 
meaning from the more general one, vis. 
that 'mineral' is anything not animal or 
vegetable). According to the evidence, 
kaolin is the main raw material in the 
manufacture of china. t therefore has 
not inconsiderable commercial value as a 
constituent element of a manufactured 
article. To achieve its recovery from the 
ground, it is necessary to mine for it in 
t sense that the over-burden (sand) under 
which it lies, has to be removed. To this 
extent, kaolin would seem to differ from 
clay found lying on the surface of the 
ground."
is Lordship therefore concluded that kaolin is 
mineral.
point cut that although His Lordship stated in 
le passage cited above that he was using the
word 'mineral1 in a "more restricted sense", in 
fact he gave it a far wider meaning than did the 
older authorities cited above, such as Donovan's 
case and the Brick and Potteries Co case. What 
he regarded as the 'restricted sense' was the 
following meaning assigned to the word 'mineral' 
in the Oxford English Dictionary, namely *■
"Any substance which is obtained by min­
ing ; a product of the bowels of the earth."
The remaining two judgments are cited by 
Mattingh A J in regard to bentonite -
the Acting Judge stated that in Lantern 
Trust (Pty) Limited v Van Sittert, 197 7 (2) 
PH A 53 (0), it was held that bentonite, 
which is a species of clay, was not a 
mineral. With respect, however, that is 
not what the car.* decided. It was a 
matter in which the applicant sought a 
declaratory order that by virtue of a 
notarial deed of cession of mineral rights, 
he was entitled to certain rights. His 
Lordship, L C titeyn (as he then was), 
stated that there was a considerable body 
of decisions to the effect that in South
T  —
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Africa 'mineral1 in the ordinary popular 
meaning, does not include clay, used in the 
manufacture of pottery, earthenware, 
bricks, tiles, pipes etc. In the short 
report, the Learned Judge is quoted as 
saying -
"I am ol the opinion that the present 
application can only succeed if it is 
established on the papers that benton­
ite is a mineral, and although this 
aspect was put in issue before the 
application was 1adged, no evidence 
was put in the founding affidavit to 
establish this disputed fact and the 
bald statement in the replying 
affidavit cannot remedy these defects."
With respect, therefore, to Hattingh A J, 
it is submitted that this case is not an 
authority to be taken into account;
Van Co l ler en Andere v Ocean Bentonite Co 
(Edms) Bpk, 1979 (1) SA 1071 (0), was again 
a case involving the question of the 
registration of a notarial lease of mineral 
rights by the Registrar of Deeds. The 
Registrar was not involved in the litiga­
tion, but he had declined to register a
*  - - c . ays of the TOntmorilionit* group and 
in particular, bentonite, attapulgite, hek- 
torite and sepiolite, as well as all shale 
nnd other types of clay which might be 
found on a particular farm. Some years 
after the Registrar had refused to regis­
ter the initial contract, he indicated that 
he was prepared to register such a notarial 
lease providing the rights were restricted 
to bentonite. Presumably, this was 
because in some manner the Registrar had 
become satisfied that bentonite was a 
mineral for the purposes of Section 3 (1)
(m) of the Deeds Registries Act. (Bento­
nite is clay which swells in the presence 
of water as opposed to other clay which 
slake. It is used for drilling purposes 
in the search for natural oil.) Certain 
of the mineral right owners were not 
prepared to sign the amended notarial lease 
by means of a power of attorney and the 
purpose of the litigation was to compel 
them to do so. The judgment in this case 
was given Van Heerden J (as he then was) 
but it is quite clear from the judgment at
1 ■ ! m c u u  i ights in respect of
i t h- montmor i 1 loii te group and
'' ' 1 Mil ti , bentonite, attapulgite, hek- 
'-di 11€ and sepiolite, as well as all shale 
m d  other typec of clay which might be 
found on a particular farm. Some years 
after the Registrar had refused to regis­
ter the initial contract, he indicated that 
he was prepared to register such a notarial 
lease providing the rights were restricted 
to bentonite. Presumably, this was 
because in seme manner the Registrar had 
become satisfied that bentonite was a 
mineral for the purposes of Section 3 (1)
(m) of the Deeds Registries A c t . (Bento­
nite is vlay whic swells in the presence 
»C water as opposed to other clay which 
-ilake. It is used for drilling purposes 
in the search for natural oil.) Certain 
of the mineral right owners were not 
prepared to sign the amended notarial lease 
by means of a power of < ttorney and the 
purpose of the litigation was to compel 
them to do so. The judgment in this case 
was given Van Heeroen J (as he then was) 
but it is quite clear from the judgment at
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1075 H that it was unnecessary i.oi the 
purposes of deciding the matter, to decide 
whether or not bentonite was a mineral. 
That was not really an issue in the case.
In tne course of examining the South African judg­
ments on the meaning of the word 'mineral 1 or 
'minerals’, reference has frequently been made to th 
position in England. The present position is to b< 
found in the Fourth Edition of Halsbury's Laws of 
England, Vol. 31, paragraph 8 where the following is, 
inter alia, said when dealing with the meaning of 
•minerals’.
"'Minerals' admits of a variety of meanings, and 
has no general definition. Whether in a parti­
cular case a substance is a mineral or not, is 
primarily a question of fact. The test is what 
•minerals’ meant at the date of the instrument 
concerned in the vernacular of the mining world, 
the commercial world and among landowners, and 
in cases of conflict, this meaning nv.st prevail 
over the purely scientific meaning. Neverthe­
less 'minerals’ is capable of limitation or 
expansion according to the intention with which 
it i .i used, and this intention may be inferred 
from the document itself, or from consideration 
of the circumstances in which it was made."
It continues at paragraph 9, dealing with particular 
minerals -
"The numerous cases in which specific substances 
have been decided or assumed to be or not to be 
minerals must, for the reasons already stated" 
(ie in paragraph 8), "be considered as decisions 
on the particular facts. Thus in particular 
circumstances the following substances have been 
held or assumed to be minerals: asphalt;
basalt; bog-earth; br ick-clay; brine; calc 
spar and calk (barytes); clay, whether common, 
china, London or terra cotta; copper; 
felsite; fireclay; freestone; gravel; 
granite; ironstone; lead; limestone; loam; 
marble; peat-earth; petroleum and natural 
gas; pitch; salt; sand; sandstone; shale; 
stone; and tin.
On the other hand, the following substances, 
which include some of those already listed 
above, have been held or assumed in particular 
circumstances not to be minerals: brick-earth
(although described as valuable); clay in the 
popular sense; clay of great thickness; free­
stone; furnace slag; gravel; limestone; 
natural g a s ; salt (obtained from lime); sand; 
sandstone; stone; and tap-cinder (obtained in 
the manufacture of pig-iron)."
The United States do^s not appear to have quite the 
same difficulty in dealing with the meaning of 
'mineral' for tax purposes. It appears from "Tax
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Management Mineral Properties other than Gas and 
Oil - Operation', 1982 Edition at A-l" that for the 
purposes of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, "the term
mineral properties' includes nonmetals such as clay,
co i L and limestone". An annual percentage depletion 
allowance is permitted in the calculation of the tax 
payable by mining companies. Ar essential factor in 
thu li'-terminat ion of that allowable percentage 
depletion, is the exact nature of the mineral being 
extracted. The United States Tax Authorities 
recognise that there are thousands of minerals and 
locks which have been identified by scientists, "many 
of which grade into each other". It would appear 
that sand, clay and stone, the substances normally 
excluded from the scope of the word 1 mineral1 in
South Africa, are all regarded in one form or
another, as minerals for the purposes of the Internal 
Revenue Code. Thus, at page A-60 of "Tax Manage­
ment", clay in various forms, falls into no less than 
four different categories for the purpose of deter­
mining the percentage depletion to which the mining 
company is entitled. There is a separate category 
dealing with "all other minerals" and the direction 
in which the classification of minerals in the United 
States is proceeding, is along two lines. Firstly,
-r
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the scientific composition of the mineral is a deter 
mining factor and in regard to the 'all other miner­
als', it is stated that some of the definitional 
problems are alleviated by applying an "end-use 
test". it seems clear, therefore, that in the 
United States at any rate, the word "mineral" is 
given a very extensive meaning.
10
1 f-Urn now t0 consider how the meaning term 'mineral' 
is to be applied in the definition of 'mining' and 
'mining operations' in the Act. I suggest -
10.1 in the words of Bristow J  in the Brick and Pot­
teries Co, v Registrar of Deeds (7.2 above), it 
is a question of intention to be ascertained 
from an examination of the Act. For that pur­
pose, it is permissible to consider the object 
which the legislature had in view. As was 
pointed out by Ramsbottom J, in Brick and Pot­
teries Co Limited v City of Johannesburg (7.3 
above), the question is, what does the legisla­
ture mean by 'mineral' in the context of the 
definition. As stated by the Learned Judge, 
the answer to that question is to be found in 
the history of the definition. ^ v e  for the 
inclusion of 'natural oil' into the definition, 
it has remained unchanged for almost seventy
- .       --      — —-— ^
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years. it is therefore submitted that what we
are today concerned with, is the meaning that
the legislature intended to give to 'mineral' in 
1917;
at that time, the legislature would have known
of or would be presum'd t know of the judgments
in the Donovan case an 1 the Brick and Potteries
Co case, both of which adopted the popular or
narrow interpretatioi of the word 'mineral*.
In other words, the meaning to be given to
'mineral' is that meaning which would be given
to it "in the vernacular of the mining world and
commercial world and 1 ndowners" in South Africa 
at that time;
since not one of the judgments referred to in 
paragraph 7 above, was concerned with the mean­
ing of the word 'mineral', in the Act, or any of 
its predecessors, great caution must be exerci­
sed in assuming that stone, such as adesite or 
gneiss or clays such as fireclay, kaolin or 
bentonite, are in fact to be regarded as miner­
als for the purposes of the Act. In this con­
nection I wish to refer specifically to the 
Nyasaland Quarries' case referred to in 7.16 
above. When dealing with that case, I expres­
sed the view that it should not be followed in
* w  —
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South Africa. I submit that it is clear from 
the judgment that the Nyasaland court, as one 
would expect it to do, fallowed English prece­
dent and relied upon the dictum by Fletcher- 
Moulton L J who defined 'mineral' in a far wider 
way than the South African judges do. It is 
not customary in South Africa to regard stone as 
a mineral. I submit that the crushed greiss is 
in fact what Fletcher-Moulton L J referred to as 
"contractors muck" even though it may not be 
mixed with earth. It does not have a value 
apart from its bulk and weight. Except for 
geological differences there is from a practical 
point of view no real difference between gneiss 
and granite and Silke, Tenth Edition at 1096, 
points out that despite the decision in the 
Nyasaland c a s e , in practice Inland Revenue does 
not regard the quarrying of granite as constitu­
ting the carrying on of mining operations or 
mining;
at pages 707 and 708 of "The Mining and Mineral 
Laws of South Africa", by Franklin and Kaplan, 
the learned authors after referring to the fac<. 
that in the popular or restricted sense of the 
word, sand, stone or clay are excluded as miner­
als, state that these exclusions require imme­
diate qualification, because of the various
■ I
judgments set out in 7.8 to 7.20 above. They 
also state that they are regarded as minerals, 
and that their extraction from the soil, will be 
regarded as a mining operation. This may well 
be the practice of Inland Revenue and be accept­
able to mining companies and individuals carry­
ing on mining, because of the favourable provi­
sions of Section 36 (7C) of the Act, relating to 
the redemption of capital expenditure, but I 
question whether it is correc from a purely 
academic point of view. Save for the judgment 
in Murchison Exploration and Mi nine Co Limited v 
T h j j Commissioner for Inland Revenue , 19 38 TPD 
421, I have not found any case where a taxpayer 
has sought to establish that it was not carrying 
on mining operations. In Murchison's case, a 
mining company had carried out prospecting, but 
had net yet produced any gold other than for 
assay purposes. However, it derived income 
from the investment of its surplus capital and 
this the Revenue sought to tax on the basis of 
the taxpayer being a gold mining company. The 
taxpayer was successful in proving that he was 
not carrying on gold mining at that stage;
clearly t cannot suggest what should be encom­
passed by the 'popular' meaning of mineral but
one thing is, I submit, clear that even today it 
is not the intention of the legislature to give 
it the widest of meanings. If it wished to do 
so, I would suggest that the legislature would 
have amended the Act to refer not to 'mineral 
but to "base minerals, natural oil, precious 
metals and precious stones as defined in Section 
1 of The Mining Rights Act, 1967." It is only 
the base minerals which are a problem in defi­
ning the meaning of 'mineral' in the Act and the 
definition now referred to is in virtually the 
widest possible terms. Tie combined effect 
would be only to exclude from 'base minerals' -
"water, not being water taken from a bore­
hole, well, excavation or natural sal’ 
for the extraction therefrom of a sul 
in solution therein and of commercial 
value"; and
"soil, not being soil taken from the earth 
for the extraction therefrom of a substance 
of commercial value therein or for the 
manufacture therefrom of a product of com-
The legislature has come very close to the "end- 
use test" applied in the United States of 
America;
the legislature has not hesitated to refer in 
the Act to The Mining Rights Act, 1967. See 
for example -
Sub-section (a) of the definition of 
'gross income' which includes in gross 
income "any amount received or accrued 
under the provisions of Section 30 (3) of 
The Mining Rights Act, 1967. This has the 
effect of including in a taxpayer's gross 
income any amount payable by the State to
or for the benefit of the holder of the
right to natural oil in respect of any 
private land over which a lease to prospect 
for natural oil has been granted under 
Section 25 (1) (g) of the Mining Rights
Act. The payment is related to the normal
tax to be received by the State under the 
Act from the disposal of natural oil won in 
the course of mining operations. But for 
this sub-section of the Act, such payment 
would, it is submitted, save in the case of 
traders in such rights, have been free of
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tax as a consideration similar to option 
money paid for the right to prospect.
(See Secretary for I n l a n d  R e v e n u e  v S t r u b o n  
Minerals (Pty) Limited, 1966 (4) SA 582 A ) ;
10.6.2 Sections ° (1) (cA) and 9 (1) (fA) dealing
with deemed sourceto which I shall refer 
below; and
10.6.3 Section 15 A (1) (importing the beneficia-
tion allowance) which provides that -
"For the purposes of this section - 
1 base mineral' means any oase mineral 
(as defined in The Mining Rights A c t , 
1967 (Act No 20 of 1967)), which has 
been mined in the Republic";
10.7 I conclude, therefore, that the present meaning 
of the word 'mineral1 in the Act is still the 
popular one.
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W O N  KROM THE SOIL
I now turn to consider the other aspect of the defi­
nition of 'mining operations' and 'mining1, namely 
what is meant by every method or process by which 
material is "won from the soil or from any substance 
or constituent thereof".
As a starting point, I refer to what I regard as 
the preferred meaning of the verb 'win' in the 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary meaning (e) of 
which is -
"to get or extract (coal, or other mineral) 
from the mine, pit or quarry; also to sink 
a shaft or make an excavation so as to 
reach (a seam of coal or vein of ore; and 
prepare it for working."
As will appear below, this meaning accords with 
the English Law but is too restrictive to be 
accepted in South African Law.
In Union Government v N’ourse Mines Limited, 1912 
TPD 924, the facts were that a producing gold 
mining company acquired the property of another 
company including a disused shaft which had
-I i IV HJ , /
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'oiik* filled with water. The water was there- 
pumped out , and the shaft recorditioned. 
in point in issue in the case was whether the 
ost >i certain sumps and of the de-watering and 
^conditioning of the shaft was working expendi­
ture within the meaning of Section of Act 6 of 
1910. In the course of his judgment, Wessels J 
las i was) said at 930 -
"The ordinary meaning of the word 'to win 
gold' is to obt;in or get the gold in the 
form of metal. To win gold includes all 
the operation, ,m s s a r y ,  not only to reach 
and extract t but also to convert it
into metal."
In R v Day and Others, 1952 (4) SA 105 N, the 
court was called upon to interpret the defini­
tions of 'mine1 and 'mineral' in Section 2 of 
the Mines and Works Act 12 of 1911. The defi­
nition of 'mine' to the extent to which it is 
relevant, was -
"mean and include all excavations for the 
purpose of searching for or winning miner­
als" .
At 109 B De Wet J s d -
"■* F—
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"Mr MacCaulay also made a point that it 
cannot be said that when sand is dug from a 
riverbed, one is thereby 'winning miner­
als', which are the words used in the defi­
nition of 'mine'. But 'winning minerals' 
means getting or obtaining minerals from 
the earth, and once it is concluded sand is 
a mineral within the meaning of the defini­
tion of the word, then when sand is dug out 
ot .1 riverbed, it amounts to mining f 
minerals within the meaning of the word 
'mine' as defined in the Act."
11.4 In England the word 'win' has been given a more 
restrictive meaning than that placed on it by 
Wessels J in the Nourse Mines case. In English 
Clays v Plymouth Corporation, 19 74 (2) ALL ER 
239 (CA), Russell L J stated at 243 -
"Our view is that to 'win' a mineral, is to 
make it available or accessible to be 
removed from the land, and to 'work' a 
mineral is (at least initially) to remove 
it from its position in the land; in the 
present case the china clay is 'won' when 
the overburden is taken away, and 'worked' 
(at least initially) when the water jets 
remove the china clay together with its 
mechanically associated other substances 
from their position in the earth or land to 
a situation of suspension in water."
This would appear to place far too restrictive a 
meaning on the word 'win'. Certain!y for the 
definition of 'mining operations' and 'mining', 
it could hardly be contended that a substance is 
"won from the soil" if it is merely exposed by 
removing the overburden in the case of an opera­
tion from the surface, or exposing it by mean-, 
of shafts adits and the like underground, and 
simply digging it out of the vein or country 
rock in which it was embedded. The concept of 
'winning' must at least go as fat as removing 
the mineral from wherever it is buried in the 
earth and bringing it to the surface. On the 
authority of the Nourse Mines' case 'winning' 
will continue until, in the case of mining for a 
metal, the meta' % been extracted from the ore.
The question that now springs to mind is the 
point at which winning begins and the point at 
which it ends. As was pointed out at 426 in 
Murchison's case, to which I have referred in 
10.4 above, in the Special Court, the President
had said -
"It appears to us that although the work 
actually done was prospect ing < r explora­
tion, mining includes such prospecting ov
exploration. It is exceedingly doubtful 
whether gold mining can he strictly limited 
to actual production of the metal."
This did not find favour with His Lordship, Mr 
Justice Mar itz with whom Murray J concurred and 
he said also at 4 26 -
"Further, the definition of 'mining1 and 
'mining operations' in Sec. 72 of the Act, 
in my opinion, excludes prospecting and 
exploration activities. Insofar as the 
Income Tax Act is concerned, mining is the 
process by which minerals are won from the 
soil for the purpose of profit. Prospec­
ting and exploration and assaying work are
merely methods adopted in order to test the 
property; in order to see whether it is 
worthwhile mining."
In Hex v Blom ind Another, 1948 TPD 708 the
issue was whether the appellant was carrying on
mining. His company carried on the business of 
the winning of and quarrying of lime. The raw 
material was extracted from the ground, proces­
sed and turned into building lime At 709 A 
Blackwell J said -
"The Mines Department apparently treat all 
these lime quarries as mines; they come 
within the definition of 'mine' as used in
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the Mines and Works Ac t , 12 ot 1911, and 
they are required to adhere to all the 
regulations for the safe conduct of mining 
made under that Act. The Department of 
Inland Revenue takes the came view. A 
mine or mining company pays taxation on a 
different basis to that of an ordinary 
company and the Department of Inland 
Revenue has always treated a company, such 
as the appellant in the present case, as a 
mining company. It is somewhat startling, 
therefore, to be told that another Depart­
ment of the Government of this country 
takes a totally different view and says 
that it is not, for the purposes of labour 
regulations, to be regarded as a mine.
The Mines Department thinks it is a mine? 
the Revenue Department thinks it is a 
mine; and the Labour Department thinks it 
is not a mine."
His Lordship distinguished the processed lime 
from stone, sand or clay, agreed with the judg­
ment of Dowling J in the Glencairn Lime case 
referred to at 7.12 above, and upheld the appeal.
In a short judgment, Roper J made the following 
significant remarks -
"I just want to say that no distinction was 
drawn in the evidence or has been drawn in 
argument in this case between the operation
of excavating limestone by qua'tying opera­
tions and conveying it thereafter to the 
roasting kilns and the further operations 
of roasting the limestone and slaking it 
and so converting it into lime. It is 
possible that a distinction may be drawn 
between these two operations in other cases 
in which the meaning of 'mining1 or a 
1 mine 1 is in question. There is no such 
distinction drawn in the present case and 
it is not material to the decision in the 
present appeal."
The Learned Judge appears to be hinting that his 
decision might have been different if, eg, after 
the limestone had been won from the soil, it had 
been sold in an unprocessed form to another 
party for processing. With respect, it is 
submitted that, as set out in 7, the real test 
is, whether limestone is or is not a mineral 
even without processing. It is, of course, a 
fact that most substances won from the soil in a 
mining operation require some form of proces­
sing, such as smelting, but could it successful­
ly be contended that if the mining company does 
not itself undertake the smelting, it is not 
winning a mineral ft* nn the soil? I submit not.
In Rand Refinery Limited v Town Council of
Go r mi s ton , 1929 Wl.D 63, the plaintiff company
went so far as to suggest that the work of refi­
ning gold and silver in which the plaintiff was 
engaged, was a purpose "incidental to mining 
operations;". The case concerned the liability 
of the plaintiff to payment of an additional 
rate imposed under Ordinance 1 of 1916 on 
improvements used for purposes not incidental to 
mining. T»-•» plaintiff urged that the object of 
mining for gold and silver is to win those 
metals in their purest form, and that the object 
of refining is to take from the bars of bullion 
what is not gold, and to get a product consis­
ting of pure gold and pure silver and that the 
work done for this purpose is therefore work 
incidental to mining operations. In effect 
they were suggesting that the refining of the 
bullion was the final step in the process of 
mining. At 70, the Learned Judge said -
"As the matter stands on the evidence 
before me, I think that, on a liberal 
interpretation of the term ' incidental' , it 
is possible to regard the purposes of 
refinery works as purposes incidental to 
'mining operations', in the general sense 
of that latter term."
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However the plaintiff was not successful in this 
action since it appeared that a substantial part 
ol the gold refined by the refinery was from 
outside the Transvaal Province, some of it com­
ing from Rhodesia and Portuguese F.asfc Africa.
The amount of this 'foreign g o l d a l t h o u g h  a 
i^ ma 1 1 proportion of the whole, was not so small 
that it could be disregarded as falling within 
the maxim "de minimis non curat lex" and His 
Lordsnip held against the plaintiff. Although 
this case turns on the meaning of the words 
"incidental to mining", the concept of the nec­
essity to refine a product before it is "won 
from the soil", is an interesting one. For 
example, in the case of the ores of iron and 
copper, the object of the mining operation is to 
mine not the ores but the iron and copper.
[’hat therefore requires a smelting process to be 
undertaken after the ore has been brought to the 
surface. Whilst ores can be disposed of with­
out being smelted, it is submitted that if the 
mining company proceeds to smelt the metal from 
the ores, that smelting process can be regarded 
as a continuation of the mining operations in 
order to win the mineral from the soil. On the 
other hand, the fact that the unsmelted ore is
disposed of to another, would not cause the 
operation to cease to be mining.
If I am correct in the supposition which I have 
made above in 7 in regard to the meaning of 
1miaeral1, then one must also consider the mean­
ing of the definition as a whole, as it would 
have been understood in 1917. Even <n those 
tim»s, it is submitted, the words 'mining' or 
'mining operations' would have been given an 
extended meaning as they are today. In the 
case of Mutual Life Insurance Co of New York v 
Ingle, 1910 TPD 540, the Full Bench of that 
Division was concerned with, inter alia, whether 
or not a condition in a life policy, had been 
breached by the insured engaging in employment 
which necessitated the inspection and oiling of 
hau ing machinery in the shaft of a mine.
Innes C J, who delivered the judgment for the 
court, said at 54 6 -
"It was contended for the respondent that 
only actual miners - the men who sever or 
break the rock - can be properly said to be 
engaged in mining operations. But it is 
impossible to adopt that narrow and limited 
construction. A mine is an underground 
excavation or passage; and 'to mine' for
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minerals is to obtain ore in, or by means 
of, such an excavation or passage and take 
it to the surface."
With respect I suggest that the Learned Judge's 
definition of "mine" and "to mine for minerals" 
should be limited to the actual context with 
which he was dealing, since even in 1910 it was 
'•’ell known that subterranean excavation was not 
the only method of mining.
11.9 In tnis connection I refer to D C T (Qld) v
Stronach, (1936) 55 CLR 305, where at 313 
Dixon J said -
"The expression 'mining1 is a familiar 
source of difficulty both in England and 
here. In its primary meaning the word 
applies to subterranean working. The 
minerals sought by subterranean working 
would, no doubt, be highly prized. But it 
was natural to extend the application of 
the word 'mining' in two directions. If 
tr operations were subterranean, the word
w applied to them, although the minerals
v e of no great value. On the other hand 
v re precious metals or minerals usually 
won by subterranean working were obtained 
by excavation which did not include subter­
ranean working, it was natural to describe 
these operations as mining. In Lord
Provost of Glasgow v Farie, (1883) 13 APP 
Cas 657 at 677, Lord Watson says that 
although the original meaning of 'mine' 
might be restricted to subterranean excava­
tion, it appeared to him to be beyond ques­
tion that for a very long period that has 
ceased to be its exclusive meaning, and 
that the word is being used in ordinary 
language to signify, either the mineral 
substances which are excavated or mined or 
the excavations, whether subterranean or 
not, from which metallic ores and fossil 
substances are dug o u t "
Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol 31, 1, has the
following to say on the meaning of 'mine1 -
"The word 'mine' is not a definite term, 
but is susceptible of limitation or expan­
sion, according to the intention with which 
it is used. 'Mine' originally meant an 
underground excavation made for the purpose 
of getting minerals, but in particular 
context, the word has been given differing 
meanings. Thus, it has been interpreted 
so as to include a place where minerals 
commonly worked underground are in the 
particular case, being worked or. the sur­
face, as in open cast coal workings and in 
certain ironstone mines."
The authorities quoted by Halsbury in support of
the aforegoing, include the Glasjow Corporation
v Farie case mentioned above, and also, inter 
alia, Sim v Evans, (1875) 23 W R  730.
In Boksburg Brick ind Fireclay Co Limited v 
Commissioner for Inlat d Revenue, rrferred to in 
/.ll above, it was aereed that the sole question 
for the determination by the court vos whether, 
on the facts stated, ttr plaintiff company car­
ried on mining operations. The relevant facts 
stated were the following -
"(b) On the said property there exists a
deposit of stratified rock ordinarily 
known as fireclay. This deposit, 
which lies at a depth of from 6 ft to 
12 ft below the surface of the 
ground, occurs in a layer of 5 ft to 
17 ft thick and exists over at least 
three-fourths of the said property.
(c) The plaintiff causes the soil lying 
on top of the fireclay to be removed 
by excavation.
(d) The plaintiff extracts the fireclay 
by drilling into it, blasting it 
loose by explosives and hauling it to 
the surface by cocoa pans on an end­
less wire rope haulage. This is the 
usual and customary method of extrac- 
tina fireclay, except where it has
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• >een ao.tenei by parciai, natural 
i is inteqrat ion, and can therefore be 
-moved by pick and shovel.
>n the surface, the fireclay is pas­
sed through grinding mills."
-i the bo tom of 2 34,. Mar itz J . who delivered
•‘".he ludqment o f . the court stated -
The words which fall for construction are
'mining operations'................. Ordinance
>2 of 1933 is a taxing measure. It does
tot define 'mining operations'. It is,
-herefore, in my opinion, permissible to 
.ice in deciding what is meant in the 
’dinance by 'mining operations' to the 
nion ineon e Tax Statutes where these words 
«rc defined. I think I am justifieo in so 
oing, because of the fact that Section 3 
') of Act 5 of 1921, clearly links the 
'rdinance with the Union Income Tax 
statutes. Section 100 of the old Union 
ncome Tax Act, No .1 of 1917, defines 
'mining operations' as follows:
"'mining operations' and 'mining' 
include every method or process by 
w h ic h  any mineral is won from the 
>iI or from any substance or consti-
* nonf thereof."
■ pi.c.sent Income Tax Act No 40 of 1925,
• ■ p< a» r, this definition (Sec. 72). I see
no reason therefore why the words 'mining 
operation' in the Ordinance should not b° 
given the same meaning as they have in the 
Union Income Tax Act. It follows on the 
facts of this case that if 'fireclay* is a 
mineral, the plaintiff company is employing 
commercially a method or process by which 
fireclay is won from the soil; that is to 
say, it is engaged in mining operations fot 
profit."
In 7.16 and 10.3 abo e I have criticised the 
judgment in the Nyasaland Quarries and Mining 
Company Limitei ise on the ground that the root 
processed gneiss was not a mineral. However , 
because of the similarity between the definition 
of 'mining operations' and 'mining' in the Fed­
eral Income Tax Act and that contained in the 
Act, it is a persuasive authority (although not 
more than that) where the Chief Justice said at 
582 -
"There can in my view be no doubt that we 
are not concerned with the meaning of the 
expression 'mining' and 'mining operations'
in their everyday sense, ............ In my
opinion, there can be no doubt whatever 
that in defining the expressions 'mining 
operations' and 'mining' as it is done, the 
legislature intended to give these expres­
sions when used elsew lere in the Act, a
meaning wider than the ordinary everyday 
meaning of those terms. Moreoover the 
extension of the usual meaning of those 
expressions is obviously intended to be a 
wide one, for the words used are very gen­
eral. 'Mining operations' and 'mining1 
are to include every method or process by 
which any mineral is won. ] it is hardly 
possible to imagine mote general words."
It is my submission, therefore, that even in 
1917 'mining* and 'mining operations' would not 
have been restricted to subterranean excava­
tions. It is a short step from accepting quar­
rying as being a mining operation to progress to 
strip mining and open cast mining, and it is 
submitted that all these types otf winning miner­
als from the soil will fall withan the defini­
tion of 'mining' and 'mining operations' which 
we have been considering.
A matter of mining or mining operations which calls 
for special consideration, however, is the recovery 
of minerals, mainly gold, from any tailings, slimes, 
waste rock or other residues in accordance with a 
permit granted under Section 161 of the Mining Rights 
Act 1967, or at Common Law where Section 161 is not 
applicable. At page 703 of the Mining and Mineral 
Laws of South Africa, the auth>rs state -
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"In Australia, it has been held in some cases 
that dump treatment constitutes mining. There 
is no decided case in South Africa, but dump 
recovery operations carried on by operating gold 
mining companies and by companies whose opera­
tions are confined to dump recovery operations, 
are, for tax purposes, regarded as carrying on 
mining operations."
Whilst it may only be of academic interest, I propose 
to consider whether or not the practice of Inland 
Revenue is correct. I do not propose to become 
involved in the controversy whether these tailing 
dumps are movable or immovable, but in relation to 
whether or not the recovery of minerals from these 
dumps is 'mining * or a 1 process of mining', for the 
purpose of the Act, requires some thought.
The case if the dump is a movable.
At 46 the authors of the Mining and Mineral Laws 
of South Africa state -
"At common law, once minerals have been 
severed from the soil, they become movables 
and the prof *rty of the holder of the 
mineral rights or mining title; and when 
the ore mined includes sand, rock or other 
material, these, too, become the property
of such holder.............. Although the
general principle governing the question
V. /
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whether any particular structure or other 
object upon a piece of land, is a movable 
or an immovable, are well settled, there 
has been a singular dearth of traditional 
authority in South Africa, upon the ques­
tion whether or not a mine dump constitutes 
a movable or immovable property."
As stated above, I do not intend to enter into 
that controversy. However, the question that 
arises in relation to the Act and the definition 
with which we are dealing is whether, once the 
dump is a movable, the operations to reprocess 
the sand, slimes and stone in the dump are 
winning 'from the soil1 or from any substance or 
constituent thereof. It is submitted that- 
having been removed from its original site by 
excavation and being dumped on top of the soil, 
the dump can no longer be regarded as part of 
the soil. Is the dump, therefore, a substance 
or constituent of the soil? At 704 of the 
Mining and Mineral Laws of South Africa, the 
authors say -
"The definition of mining in the Income Tax 
Act refers to the winning of the mineral 
from the soil, which would appear to con­
template that in mining, the mineral or ore 
must be recovered from the soil. The word 
'soil', which is not defined, is more res­
trictive than the word 'earth' which is
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used in the definition in the Mining Rights 
A c t , and was also used in the definition of 
mining in the Transvaal Gold Law. Soil is 
usually regarded as the upper layer of the 
earth in which plants grow, and an gneons 
or sedimentary formation several thousand 
me '.res below the earth's surface would not 
ordinarily be regarded as soil. In the 
context in which it is used, however, soil 
must be regarded as any part of the earth's 
crust, and mining will cover the recovery 
if a ly mineral in and forming part of that 
crus* . The additional phraseology - "any 
substor is o, constituent thereof" - does 
net "it is submitted, extend the concept of 
mining".
If the learned authors are correct, and on the 
assumption that the dump is a movable, then it 
is submitted that it has ceased to be part of 
the soil - it is no longer part of the earth's 
crust. What it has become is something deposi­
ted upon the soil - upon the earth's crust. It 
is, therefore, submitted that in those circum­
stances the removal of the dump or portions 
thereof and its transport to a treatment plant
for Lhe removal of various mineral substances 
from the tailings is not a mining operation, nor 
mining; not a winning from the soil. A possi­
bility to be considered is that the learned 
authors are wrong when they say the additional 
phrase - "any substance or constituent thereof", 
does not extend the concept of mining. Those 
words have been included in the definition since 
at least the passing of the Income Tax Act No 40 
of 192 5 and it is not lightly to be assumed that 
words included in a statute are without meaning 
or are tautologous. It has been known since 
the turn of the century that gold recovery in 
the early days of mining was incomplete. In a 
report entitled "Historical Review of certain 
Aspects of the Taxation of Gold Mines in the 
Transvaal and Orange Free Stat<->" presented by 
J W Shilling to the University of the Witwaters- 
rand in part fulfilment of the reguir ments of 
the Higher Diploma in Tax Law, the following 
appears at 17 in connection with the use of the 
cyanide recovery process discovered by McArthur 
s. Forrest in 1887 -
"The use of this process probably demon­
strated , at a fairly early stage, the 
ability to recover silver and osmir idium
occurring in the gold ores, jiving rise to 
additional revenue for the gold mines."
Was not the legislature, in referring to "any 
substance or constituent thereof" conscious of 
the ability to retreat dumps in order to extract 
therefrom minerals left therein by reason of the 
early imperfect recovery process? There can be 
little doubt, as pointed out by the authors, 
that excavations which have taken place several 
thousand metres below the surface of the earth 
would not ordinarily be regarded as a removal 
from the soil. Nevertheless, if it is, in 
fact, so regarded, then logically, the waste 
material which has been dumped, must at one 
*-ime, have formed part of the soil and was, at 
some time, a substance or constituent of the 
soil. On that assumption, it is submitted that 
the retreatment of the dump materials is a con­
tinuation of the mining process since, as point­
ed out by Wessels J in the Nourse Mines' case, 
the purpose of mining for gold is not only to 
extract the ore, but also to convert it into 
metal, the very object of the reprocessing.
Does it make any difference whether this 
retreatment operation is carried on by the
original mining company, many of which no longer 
exist, the ownership of the dumps having passed 
into new hands? It is submitted that it will 
not, if the dump is soil or a substance or a 
constituent thereof. As I understand the pro­
cess of removing the dump for treatment, it can 
be classed as quarrying or open cast mining.
The top of the dump usually contains very little 
gold if any at all. The real values increase 
as the excavating proceeds, the particles of 
gold bavin, iravitated towards the bottom of the 
dump. In effect, the party retreating the 
substances in the dump is removing the overbur­
den, a normal practice in strip or open cast 
mining. It must be remembered that save for 
the reference to 'mineral', the definition has 
been given an extended meaning. Will it make a 
difference if the owner of the dump does not 
retreat it itself, but leases that right to a 
third party? This is the situation which 
Roper J had in mind in R v Blom with which I 
have dealt above.
The position if the dump is immovable.
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If, as some contend, the dump has acceded to the 
land on which it is situated, then it is submit­
ted that it will more certainly have become part 
of the soil or a substance or constituent there­
of. A fortiori then the removal of the mater­
ial will be a method or process of winning a 
mineral from the soil, whether the mining com­
pany, which created the dump, or its successor- 
in-title or a third party carries out the pro­
cess .
12.3 It is submitted, therefore, that the practice of
the Department of Inland Revenue of regarding 
dump recovery operations as mining or a mining 
operation, is correct.
SOURCE
13
13.1 The definition of 'gross income1 in Section 1 of
the Act stipulates that the total amount in 
cash, or otherwise, received by or accrued to or 
in favour of any person during a year of assess­
ment "from a source within or deemed to be with­
in t-he Republic" excluding, of course, receipts
m m *
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or accruals of a capital nature, is part of the 
gross income of a taxpayer. The Act does not 
define 'source' and indeed it has been said on 
more than one occasion that it is "probably an 
impossible task" to formulate a definition which 
would furnish a universal test for determining 
when an amount is received from a source within 
the Republic. The general rules for determi­
ning the source of gross income are . p i icable 
to gross income derived from mining r > ;  mining 
operations. However, I propose ? illustrate 
some of those general ru'.es in a case relating 
to the sale of mining claims, and to deal with 
'deemed source'.
13.2 In the Privy Council judgment in the case of
Rhodesian Metals Limited (In Liquidation) v
Commission ?r of Taxes, reported at 1940 AD 432 
at 436 and 137, Lord Atkin who delivered the 
judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council, saia -
"I- capital productively employed in the 
place where it purchases stock which is 
profitably sold elsewhere; or in the place 
where the stock which now represents the 
capital is sold; or for the purposes of 
the test, must both purchases and sales
/ ,
'•* • •
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occur in the same plat >; or is it suffi­
cient that th^ place of the direction of 
the employment n F the capital in purchasing 
or selling, should denote where the capital 
is productively employed? Perhaps in 
o er words it may be said, does it mean 
.nore than carrying on business in a 
place? Their Lordships inclined to the 
view, quoted with approval from Mr Ingram's 
work on Income Tax by Mr Justice De 
Villiers in his dissenting judgment:
"Source means not a legal concept, bot 
something which a practical man would 
regard as a real source of income"; "the 
ascertaining of the actual source is a 
practical hard matter of fact."
Although quoting with approval from the dissen­
ting judgment of De Villiers J A, their Lord­
ships upheld the judgment of the Appellate Divi­
sion in Rhodesia Metals Limited (In Liquidation) 
v Commissioner of Taxes , 1938 AD 282. The 
facts in the mntter were rather complicated and 
it is unnecessary to deal with them in any 
detail. Briefly, what happened was that Sir 
Edmund Davis, a director of companies in London, 
obtained an option via his agent in R'.odesia to 
purchase a number of tungsten claims known as 
the Sequel Mine in the mining district of Bula­
wayo. Davis formed two companies in London on 
the same day. The one was the appellant in the
-A*
' ' '..i ■ i ■ uotaprtny «. nown a a
■>l Hwjtoiii1: us :in.j Metal Limited. Ac a
■esult ot a series of transactions, claims m d  
>ptionc passed from Davis personally to the 
ippellant and thence almost immediately, to
Swithin 1s . The appellant remained with some 
1.10 claims and four days after the first stage 
the transactions had been completed, the 
ippellant was placed into voluntary liquida- 
n. Twelve days' later the liquidator offer- 
to sell the remaining 1 110 claims to 
t Swithin*8. In the result, both Davis, per-
onally, and the appellant, made substantia]
>rofits which the Appeal Court had no difficulty 
rinding, were gross income and not a capital 
'it . contended by the appellant.
econd issue in the case was, however, the 
inaction of whether or not the receipt or 
icarua.I., which had been found was not of a 
ipital nature, was received by or accrued to, 
in favour of the taxpayer, from any source 
ithin Southern Rhodesia. All the transactions 
oi erred between Davis, the appellant and 
St Swi thin1 r; had been carried out in London, 
whin' w.-i: S 11 Kd round ' ; only place of business
The money was paid in London.
Strathford C J , said at ^90 -
"In the piesent case we have to determine 
whether the profit was due to the produc 
tive employment of the company's capital 1 
Rhodesia, or on the other hand, to ius 
organisation and connections, or to its 
special aptitude or equipment, or the spe 
cial intelligence of its Lu'ird - all of 
these being in the plfie where the compan 
resided, which was London. I accept, 
unhesitatingly as a premise, that in thi 
case, the capital of the company was 
employed in Rhodesia. Of its total cap) 
tal of £10 000, £5 00 was spent in the
acquisition of the claims and £2 000 odd i 
work done on them. The claims were in 
Rhodesia. Therefore, the risk of depre­
ciation or the hope of appreciation, war 
attached to the Rhodesian acquisition."
At 297, Tindall J A, who d e l i v e r e d  i •oncun*: ■
judgment, said -
"The correct; i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of the tacts, 
in my judgment, is that Rhodesia Mecals 
employed its capital in buying cheapl •• a 
valuable asset situate in Rhodesia and had  
resold the asset at a large profit in 
uondon. The purchase and the s a l e  by 
Rhodesia Metals took place in L o n d o n  v/h-• r-
- * ¥
"  ' , 
■  -»'v K :
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also, Davis carried out his activities in 
floating the companies and bringing about 
the ultimate profitable sale of the 
claims. But from these facts, it does not 
follow that the transactions in London were 
the real cause of the profit made. No
doubt the ability and experience of Davis
were important factors; but in my view, 
the dominant factor in, the true origin of, 
the profit was the value of the claims. I 
hold, therefore, that Rhodesia Metals, in 
buying and developing the claims and 
selling them at a profit, employed its
capital in Rhodesia............. Under the
Rhodesian Statute, the enquiry is concerned 
with the 'source1 of the profit. In the 
circumstances of a particular case the 
origin of the profit may be the country 
where the asset realised is situated. The 
present, in my judgment, is such a case."
He therefore dismissed the appeal and De Wet J A
and Fetham A J A concurred in that judgment.
13.7 In his dissenting judgment, De Vi liers J A said
at 298 -
"Insofar as it (Rhodesia Metals) can be 
said to have car r ied on any 'trade' or 
•business' during its i ief existence, such 
trade or business was carried on in 
London. There are two, and only two, 
things connecting the transaction with
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and Fetham A J A concurred in that judgment.
13.7 In his dissenting judgment, De Villiers J A said
at 298 -
"Insofar as it (Rhodesia Metals) can be 
said to have carried on any 'trade' or 
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trade or business was carried on in 
London. There are two, and only two, 
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Southern Rhodesia, vis (a) the fact that 
the tungsten claims were situated in 
Rhodesia, and (b) the fact that Rhodesia 
Metals spent some £2 000 in developing
those claims............ I cannot, however ,
regard these two factors as forming (either 
singularly or together) the dominant causes 
of the profit made by Rhodesia Metals.
........ As to the fact that the tungsten
claims were situate in Southern Rhodesia, I 
cannot regard that as a factor of prime 
importance in the present case, or as a 
'dominant1 factor."
13.8 He continued at 299 -
"Then the sole question is, where was the 
capital employed? In my opinion it was 
employed in London. It was in London 
before the transactions in question took 
place. It never left London. It did not 
travel to Southern Rhodesia in order to 
fertilise the tungsten claims or in order 
to cause them to produce a profit. It 
remained throughout in London. The tung­
sten claims did not appreciate in value 
between the dates of buying and selling; 
no revenue was derived from the tungsten 
claims, nor was any ore or metal extracted 
from them, by Rhodesia Metals. In short, 
the tungsten claims contributed nothing 
whatsoever to the profit. Had they appre­
ciated in value between the date when 
Rhodesia Metals bought them, and the date
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when it sold them, the case would have been 
quite different; but clearly t lie re was no 
enhancement in value between the two 
dates. Everything else connected with the 
profit-making took place in London, as I 
have pointed out, and the profit (£146 000) 
actually came into the hands of Rhodesia 
Metals in London. Indeed, to put it 
shortly, the whole affair was a London 
financial transaction. To use the phrase­
ology of Searle, J . in Commissioner of 
Revenue v Dunn, the profits sprang from 
something carried on or effected in 
London; the origin of the profit was in 
London (1918 AD at p.610). Therefore, if 
it be taken that the profit in this case 
was made by the productive employment of 
capital, the 1 source' of such profit was in 
London.H
In the very next judgment at 301, Sir Edmund 
found himself the unsuccessful appellant in 
regard to his personal assessment for tax on the 
profit which he personally made in the same 
transact ion.
By Act No 95 of 1967 the legislature enacted 
Sub-section (cA) of Section 9 (1) of trie Act, 
which reads as follows -
"9 (1) An amount shall be deemed to have
accrued to any person from a source
within the Republic, if it has been 
received by or has accrued to or in 
favour of :,uch person by virtue of
........... (cA) any contract mede by
such person for the disposal of any 
mineral (including natural oil) won by 
him in the course of mining operations 
carried on by him under any mining 
lease granted under the Mining Rights 
Act, 1967 (Act 20 of 1967), whereso­
ever such contract was made or such 
mining operations were carried on;"
Because the application of Sub-section 1 (cA) of 
Section 9 is limited to mining operations car­
ried on under any mining lease granted under the 
Mining Rights Act, it follows that it has no 
application to gross income derived from base 
minerals mined on privately owned land, nor to 
the disposal of any minerals mined pursuant to 
other mining rights held or acquired under the 
Mining Rights Act, such as claims or mining 
claims, or small mining operations referred to 
in Section 21 (2) of the Mining Rights Act.
The Mining Rights Act applies only to mining 
carried out in the Republic, including the con­
tinental shelf, which, in terms of Section 7 of 
the Territorial Waters Act, No 87 of 1963, is 
deemed to be part of the Republic for the purpo­
ses of the exploitation of natural resources,
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and is also deemed to be unalienated State land 
for the purposes of the Mining Laws, but not the 
Act. The amendment to the Act was therefore 
essential to extend its operation to cover gross 
income received or accrued from operations on 
the continental shelf.
13.12 Another amendment to the Ac t , also introduced by
Act 95 of 1967, was Sub-section 1 (fA) which 
deems to have accrued within the Republic any 
amount received by or accrued to in favour of a 
person by virtue of "any services rendered by 
such person to, or work or labour done by such 
person for, any other person upon, beneath or 
above the continental shelf referred to in Sec­
tion 7 of the Territorial Waters Act, in the 
course of operations carried on by such other 
person under any prospecting or mining lease 
granted under the Mining Rights Act, 1967 (Act 
No 20 of 1967) , or under any sublease granted 
under any such lease, wheresoever payment for 
such services or work or labour is to be 
made;". This amendment was also necessary for 
the reasons set out in 13.11.
Conclusion
14 I have not, in this report, sought to deal wich the
detail of the taxation of Mining Companies contained 
in Sections 15, 36 and 37 of the A c t . Topics such as 
Capital Expenditure ranking for redemption, Recoup­
ment, the Capital Allowance, the difference in tax 
treatment of the various types of gold mines, and 
diamond mines would warrant a separate report it to 
be dealt with in a satisfactory manner. I have 
therefore, in the main, confined myself to a con­
sideration of the starting point in relation to 
Mining Tax.
C A JAFFE
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